Keynote, UNIFI Sustainability and Responsibility Seminar

Sustainability. What is it? It’s behaving. It’s being responsible. It’s what you teach your kids. But still something we often neglect when it really matters.

The obvious somehow becomes expendable. The factor that is totally crucial for long term viability or even profitability becomes something you postpone, push aside.

The topic of sustainability and responsibility in business is the biggest issue that faces our industries, our world,  today.

Because what we do today defines what the world will look like tomorrow.

Climate change affects everything and everyone in one way or the other. It affects the most basic things in our lives – from where it is possible to live to what kind of food we can grow and eat.

We are dependent on our ecosystems in everything we do. So why not take care of it. Why not give it the attention it deserves?

We know what to do.

We need to reduce our emissions. We need to stop the loss of biodiversity. We need a transition to clean, renewable energy. We need an industrial revolution.

And yes, I say industrial – because our businesses are central in contributing to the transition to a more sustainable economy.

As a fairly small player globally, one might think that what happens in Finland is not that important on a larger scale, but that could not be further from the truth. It’s not about our absolute share of global greenhouse gases. It’s about the positive impact we can make, it’s about our handprint.

I’ll give you one example. The frequency converter, a small device that makes electrical motors more effective, saves 135 000 000 tons of Co2 emissions annually and globally. That handprint comes to a large extent from Vasa, where Vacon, nowadays Danfoss, is one of the trailblazers in the field.

So what happens in Finland does not stay in Finland – we have every opportunity to show leadership and show the way.

By doing this, we are one step ahead – by promoting research and innovation on sustainability related issues we can create new solutions to the challenges we face.

And we all know these challenges need addressing. Therefore the demand for solutions, products and services in line with sustainability standards will grow – and Finnish businesses can be at the forefront of providing these solutions.

As an active member of the Europan Union, we have an important role to play as well.

The EU is the largest single market in the world. This is something of a favourite subject of mine, so if you’ll allow me, I would like to highlight this: it is the largest single market – in the world.

And what does this mean? It’s a market without borders. It means that it allows goods, services, and people to freely move within the union. It allows us to do trade and business with each other.

While creating a broader choice of products and services for all EU citizens, it also creates an opportunity for the EU to set standards.

And when the EU sets standards it has global implications. In a way, it’s as simple as that – when we are ambitious and demand more, the surrounding world needs to do more – if they want to take part in the largest single market in the world.

By looking ahead, by seeing opportunities instead of problems, and by thinking outside of the box instead of sticking our head into the sand we can have a real global impact – both Finland as a nation, and the European Union as a community on the global level.

That is why we need to work with an ambitious and serious agenda on the Green transition and on sustainable growth.

The European Commission introduced the EU Green Deal in December 2019 – almost exactly 4 years ago.

As you all know, the main goal is to make the EU climate neutral by 2050, and transform the EU economy to become more sustainable.

An important milestone in the EU Green Deal is the 2030 goal of reducing green house gas pollution by 55 per cent compared to the levels from 1990.

As the EU loves project names, and acronyms – I really have had to work on those – the goal of reaching this has been named “Fit for 55”, where 15 different legislative proposals have been put forward regarding climate, energy, transport, finance and taxation.

Not all of these are without problems for Finland of course. I would assume most of us have heard things about the Nature restoration law, or “Ennalistamisasetus” in Finnish – or the EU Forest Strategy, filled with acronyms like LULUCF and concepts like taxonomy.

I will not go into these today, but the public discussion around these clearly shows how difficult it will be to reach commonly accepted solutions to the existential problems we are facing.

That being said, it is of course important that EU regulation takes national realities into account. Therefore this government will put effort into be even more effective in influencing EU policy in a timely fashion, before they become decided regulation.

Even though there is a new Commission coming next year, and we have elections coming up and a new European Parliament where political power may shift, we can be fairly certain that the path we are on is the one that we will continue to walk.

The Commission President Ursula von der Leyen kept the green transition as the number one concept also in her recent State of the Union speech.

The new Commission, no matter how it will look like, will begin by shaping the 2040 goals, on our way to 2050. This is one of the major tasks right at the start of the new term.

I think it’s important to make sure that we also see the opportunities that exist within these challenges.

Because even though we face serious challenges in many sectors, we have also done many things right in Finland. It is not a coincidence that our green transition investment pipeline exceeded 100 billion euros.

Us being trailblazers in the green transition is due to us having the cheapest electricity in Northern Europe and the best electricity grid. And those things again, are due to us being ahead in the very same green transition. Is it the Chicken or the egg? Kind of both at the same time.

As Nordic countries we also have an opportunity to carry the issue forward together and set an example for our fellow member states.

Dear friends,

We have to remember that sustainability is a cross-sector concept, in order to affect real change we need to see action on all levels in society.

Higher education plays an important role here.

Finland has been strongly involved in promoting the construction of the European Education Area. We can congratulate ourselves on the fact that Finnish universities have been very successful in the highly competitive European Universities initiative, with 19 universities already participating.

We’ve certainly had challenges recently – Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine, the pandemic, and heightened tensions in world politics underline the importance of a crisis-resistant society, both at a national and a European level. This highlights the need to make sure students preserve their faith in a better future, and here we all have a responsibility.

Universities, through their research knowledge and expertise, have an important role to play in building crisis resilience and security of supply, and in supporting the EU’s self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy.

Universities can and should be able to respond to the rapidly changing skills needs of the labor market, and support business renewal as well as raising the education levels of the population.

I firmly believe that the free movement of students, researchers and scientists within and outside the EU provides the best added value.

The Erasmus programme, for example, is the crown jewel of European student exchange. I would strongly encourage students, teachers and researchers alike to take part in exchange programmes and the various European cooperation projects that are offered.

My own journey through exchange studies both in Portugal and Spain certainly shaped me and my life. I cast my vote for Finland’s entry into the EU while I was living the European dream, as an Erasmus student in Barcelona.

We know that there will be fierce competition for talent, it’s obviously already happening today, but will be even more fierce tomorrow. Industrial productivity, the prosperity of our societies and the achievement of our climate objectives depend in large part on the ability to retain and attract workers.

This is not only my view, but it is widely shared in the EU member states. In the conclusions of the European Council, this has repeatedly been at the forefront.

The need to strengthen education and research is key when we want to reinforce our strategic autonomy and competitiveness. The emphasis on strong cooperation in education and research is therefore very important for us.

The availability of skilled labour has recently been at the center of many Commission initiatives. All fields are included – some are more vital than others; the clean transition, cybersecurity, the battery industry, digital skills, well educated teachers, knowledge of space and so on.

We must also talk about a commitment to research and development funding. The current government is committed to a historic long-term investment. This will significantly strengthen the capacity of universities and research institutions.

From next year, we will substantially increase the level of national R&D funding towards 4 percent of GDP. Our firm intention is to create a solid basis and conditions for improving Finland’s competitiveness long into the future.

These increases will be targeted at activities with the widest possible impact on productivity and economic growth.

Particular emphasis will be placed on basic research at universities, applied research at universities of applied sciences and on increasing and modernising researcher training, so that we can make the most of this investment.

Finland has also long argued that all EU member states should increase R&D investment towards the commonly agreed EU target of 3 percent of GDP.

We are now setting a good example – and our 4 per cent target and its implementation has indeed attracted a lot of interest from both other member states and also from the European Commission.

Dear friends –

It comes down to this. The green transition is a huge opportunity for all of us. For businesses, for education, for society. Over 100 billions of investments are queueing up at our border. If even a small part of those become reality the benefits are substantial.

This is an industrial revolution and the universities are the factories of the future. We already some of the tools to make it happen. You create more as we speak. The opportunities lie ahead of us. They are  obvious, they are crucial, and fortunately even profitable.  So no more postponements. No pushing aside. Let’s get to it.

(Keynote held att Svenska Handelshögskolan 7.11.2023)

Adlercreutz talousarvioesityksestä: Tärkeitä panostuksia Suomen kilpailukyvyn vahvistamiseksi

Eurooppa- ja omistajaohjausministeri Anders Adlercreutz on tyytyväinen hallituksen neuvottelutulokseen talousarvioesityksestä vuodelle 2024. Esityksessä keskitytään Suomen julkisen talouden vahvistamiseen ja velkaantumiseen hillitsemiseen. Esitys sisältää panostuksia, jotka vahvistavat Suomen kilpailukykyä.

Adlercreutz painottaa, että talousarvioehdotuksen menopuoli on hyvin maltillinen.

– Vaikka olemme joutuneet sopeuttamaan taloutta monin eri tavoin, alijäämä on kuitenkin todella suuri. Näin ei pitäisi olla. Tulevien vuosien toimet tulevat pienentämään alijäämää niin kauan kuin huolehdimme talouskasvun edellytyksistä sekä työllisyysasteen pitämisestä korkealla. Siksi hallituksen toimia tarvitaan, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Adlercreutz on erityisen tyytyväinen panostuksiin tutkimukseen ja kehitykseen, vihreän siirtymän edistämiseen sekä tarpeellisiin infrahankkeisiin.

– Suomen kilpailukyky rakentuu sen varaan, että tutkimukseen, kehityksen ja innovaatioihin panostetaan. Hallituksen ehdotuksen mukaan rahoitus tutkimukselle ja kehitykselle olisi vuonna 2024 noin 280 miljoonaa euroa suurempi kuin tänä vuonna. Hallitus on myös päättänyt ohjata REPowerEU-rahoitusta mm. vihreän siirtymän edistämiseen. Tärkeinä kokonaisuuksina haluan painottaa myös panostuksia lataus- ja tankkausinfrastruktuuriin sekä METSO-, HELMI- ja NOUSU-ohjelmien rahoitukseen, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Hallitusneuvotteluissa sovittiin neljän miljardin euron investointiohjelmasta kasvun vauhdittamiseksi. Adlercreutzin mukaan nämä panostukset lähtevät nyt liikkeelle monen tarpeellisen infrahankkeen myötä. Hallitus on tehnyt päätöksiä sekä rahoituksesta että myös tiettyjen hankkeiden kiirehtimisestä.

– Olen erityisen iloinen siitä, että Rantaradan kehittämissuunnitelma välillä Kauklahti–Karjaa kuuluu kiireellisesti edistettäviin hankkeisiin. Päätös rahoituksesta tullaan tekemään vuonna 2024. On hyvin tärkeää, että Rantaradan kehittämistä edistetään. Sillä on keskeinen rooli koko Länsi-Uudellamaalla, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Adlercreutz nostaa lisäksi esiin ehdotuksen valtuuden myöntämisestä Koverharin meriväylän syventämiselle vuoden 2023 toisen lisätalousarvion puitteissa, sekä Loviisan meriväylän syventämisen, joka myös kuuluu kiireellisesti edistettäviin hankkeisiin. Sen osalta rahoituspäätös tehdään vuonna 2025.

Puhe Eurooppanuorten Linnaseminaarissa 19.8.2023

Arvoisat kuulijat, arvoisat Eurooppanuoret,

Kiitos kutsusta tulla puhumaan Linnaseminaariinne.

EU, Euroopan unioni – siitä puhumme tänään. Teidän, jotka olette kasvaneet Suomessa meidän jo ollessa EU-jäseniä, on varmaan vaikea ymmärtää, miten houkuttelevalta Euroopan unionin jäsenyys tuntui nuorelta opiskelijalta 90-luvun alussa. Olimme tarponeet läpi YYA-Suomen, pikkuhiljaa lähentyneet länttä ja Eurooppaa, ja yhtäkkiä EU oli käden ulottuvilla.

Keskustelu EU:sta ei ehkä silloin ollut kovin korkeatasoista. EU-keskustelua käytiin pitkälti ruoan hinnan ympärillä – EU:n jäsenyys tekisi ruoasta halpaa – tai pelotteiden kautta – EU romuttaisi maatalouden ja toisi ydinaseet Suomeen. Niin, näitä samojen argumenttien heijastuksia näkyy myös tämän päivän keskustelussa.

Ja ihan kuten silloin, niin EU:n vastustuksessa on tänäänkin usein kyse myös vanhan kaipuusta. Nostalgiasta, toiveajattelusta ja naiiviudesta.

Kun me Suomessa äänestimme jäsenyydestä vuonna 1994 minä itse elin eurooppalaista unelmaa. Olin Erasmus-vaihdossa Barcelonassa opiskelemassa arkkitehtuuria, oppimassa kieltä, juomassa punaviiniä. Eurooppa oli huumaava kokemus. Se, että kyllä-puoli voitti kansanäänestyksessä tuntui itsestään selvältä, mutta mahtavalta. Miten kukaan voisi vastustaa sitä, että Suomesta tulee osa Eurooppaa, ajattelin. En voinut kuvitellakaan, että äänestys voisi päätyä toisin.

EU merkitsi itselleni vapautta ja kansainvälisyyttä. Ja se merkitsee sitä vieläkin.

Olen toiminut eurooppa- ja omistajaohjausministerinä nyt vajaat yhdeksän viikkoa. Ja jos asiat muuten ovat lähteneet verkkaisesti, jopa hieman yskien, liikkeelle, niin EU-asioiden osalta ministerikauteni aloitus oli varsin vauhdikas: Heti hallituksen nimitystä seuraavana päivänä matkasin ensimmäiselle työmatkalleni Tukholmaan.

Siellä osallistuin epäviralliseen eurooppaministerikokoukseen, jonka aikana keskusteltiin mm. EU:n laajentumisesta. Ihan kuten 1994, niin nytkin monet maat kolkuttelevat EU:n ovea.

Venäjän hyökkäys Ukrainaan on saanut meidät taas kerran arvioimaan koko Eurooppaa, koko EU:ta, geopoliittisen pelikentän kautta.

Ei, EU ei ole varsinaisesti turvallisuuspoliittinen unioni. Mutta se tarjoaa yhteisön, ja sen kautta se tarjoaa myös suojaa.

Koska harmaa alue ei ole turvallinen. Kahden välissä ei ole turvallista ajella. Ja vaikka miten haluaisin ajatella, että polarisaatio ei ole hyvästä, niin viimeistään tänään kaikki tiedämme, että väliinputoajat ovat pulassa.

Kasakka ottaa sen, mikä on huonosti kiinni.

Siksi tämä sota on saanut laajentumiskeskustelun taas liikkeelle. Georgia, Moldova ja ennen kaikkea Ukraina tarvitsevat EU:n tarjoaman poliittisen suojan.

Keskustelu laajentumisesta pitää periaatteessa sisällään myös pohdintaa siitä, minkälaisen unionin me haluamme. Laajentumisprosessissa EU asettaa vaatimuksia ja ehtoja, joihin ehdokasmaiden on pystyttävä vastaamaan. Näiden ehtojen uusien jäsenten tulee täyttää – mutta ne pätevät tietenkin myös vanhoihin.

Laajentumiseen liittyvät ehdot ovat tehokkaita ohjaamaan ehdokasmaita kohti tarvittavia uudistuksia. Tästä keskustelimme ensimmäisessä EU-kokouksessani. Pääsin siis tavallaan heti alkuun EU:ta määrittelevien perusasioiden äärelle: yhdessä edistämme demokratiaa, oikeusvaltiota, ihmisoikeuksia ja markkinataloutta. Liittymiskriteereissä kiteytyy se, miksi EU on olemassa, mitä arvoja haluamme edistää, ja se minne olemme viemässä unionia.

EU on Suomen tärkein poliittinen ja taloudellinen viitekehys ja myös tärkein arvoyhteisö. EU on rauhanprojekti, joka on avannut Suomelle, Suomen kansalaisille ja suomalaisille yrityksille ovet Eurooppaan ja laajemmin koko maailmaan.

EU-jäsenyydellä on suomalaisten vahva tuki, ja olemalla osa yhteisöä meillä on myös kokoamme suurempi mahdollisuus vaikuttaa globaalilla tasolla. Siksi on meidän kaikkien etu, että EU on globaalisti vahva ja toimintakykyinen.

Tämä tuli selväksi viimeistään Venäjän hyökkäyssodan myötä. Silloin turvallisuusympäristömme muuttui merkittävästi ja pitkäkestoisesti. Hyökkäyssota on korostanut sitä, miten tärkeitä yhteiset arvomme ovat ja miten tärkeää on, että EU on toimintakykyinen myös kriisin edessä.

Suomi on osana EU:ta ja yhdessä EU:n kumppanien kanssa vastannut Venäjän hyökkäyssotaan nopeasti, päättäväisesti ja yhtenäisesti. Tätä yhtenäisyyttä on vaalittava ja sen varaan on rakennettava jatkossakin.

Koska on myös selvää, että ennen sotaa varmuutta toimintakyvystä ei ollut. On myös enemmän kuin todennäköistä, että mikäli EU olisi ennen sotaa voinut päättää, että nämä ovat vastatoimemme, jos olisimme viestittäneet Putinille, että hanat katkeavat, putket tukitaan, ovi SWIFT-järjestelmään sulkeutuu, varat jäädytetään ja Ukrainaa tuetaan kaikin keinoin, niin sotaa ei olisi tullut.

Jos olisimme ennen sotaa pystyneet itse kuvittelemaan mitä voi tapahtua, jos olisimme piirtäneet nämä skenaariot, jos olisimme olleet tarpeeksi toimintakykyisiä, niin väitän, että tätä sotaa ei olisi tullut.

Mutta nyt olemme tässä, ja tuen on jatkuttava.

Suomi on tähän mennessä tukenut Ukrainaa 1,74 miljardilla eurolla. Tämä sisältää 1,2 miljardia euroa puolustusmateriaalitukea, yhteensä 17 puolustustarvikepakettia.

Olemmeko auttaneet paljon vai vähän? Jos Suomen tuen suhteuttaa BKT:hen, niin USA:n kohdalla se tarkoittaisi 150 miljardin dollarin tukea.

Se on merkittävä summa kaikilla mittareilla. Ja me olemme pystyneet toimittamaan hyvää, tärkeää tavaraa, koska me olimme varautuneita. Meillä oli, ja on, varastossa sitä tavaraa, jota kriisissä tarvitaan.

Me jatkamme Ukrainan tukemista – niin kauan kuin se on tarpeen.

Hyvät ystävät,

Olemme unionina oppineet paljon viimeisten vuosien aikana.

Elina Valtonen, Antero Vartia ja minä teimme vuonna 2016 kirjallisen kysymyksen, jossa kyseenalaistimme NordStream II -putken rakentamisen siksi, että se mielestämme sisälsi selviä turvallisuuspoliittisia ulottuvuuksia ja riskejä. Tämän Venäjän toimet olivat silloin jo tehneet selväksi. Kysymystä seurasi silloin tuohtumusta kollegojemme joukossa ja vastaus oli, että putki on pelkkä ympäristökysymys.

Nyt tiedämme paremmin.

Venäjän hyökkäyssodan myötä energiariippuvuuksien vaikutukset Eurooppaan ovat tulleet selväksi kaikille. Hyökkäyssotaa seurannut energiakriisi osoitti, kuinka tärkeää on, että Eurooppa ei ole riippuvainen unionin ulkopuolelta tuodusta fossiilienergiasta. Fossiilittomaan energiantuotantoon siirtyminen on tärkeää, jotta voimme vähentää riippuvuuksiamme ja samalla vähentää Venäjän mahdollisuuksia horjuttaa Eurooppaa ja yhtenäisyyttämme.

Samalla meidän on suojeltava ja vahvistettava demokratiaa. Eri hybridivaikuttamisen keinot ja disinformaation levittäminen ovat omiaan nakertamaan uskoa poliittisen järjestelmään ja kylvämään kahtiajakoa ja eripuraa.

Demokratiavajeen syntymiseen johtavaa kehitystä on pyrittävä ennaltaehkäisemään sekä unionissa että jäsenmaissa. Tässä oikeusvaltiomekanismilla on tärkeä rooli. Se on prosessi, jossa komissio, EU:n neuvosto ja Euroopan parlamentti käy vuosittaista vuoropuhelua jäsenmaiden kanssa oikeusvaltioperiaatteen toteutumiseen ja sen edistämiseen liittyvistä asioista.

Kun meillä on monella tapaa tulonsiirtoihin ja osittaiseen yhteisvastuuseen perustava unioni, on pelisääntöjen oltava kaikille samat. Jos otat EU:n jäsenenä rahaa vastaan, sinun tulee myös pelata yhteisten sääntöjen mukaan. Ja ajatus siitä, että Ukrainan tukea, yhden esimerkin mainitakseni, käytetään panttivankina jotta jokin maa saisi muita etuja, on kestämätön. Sääntöjen tulee olla kaikille samat. Muuten pakka ei pysy kasassa.

Siksi sisäisen toimivuuden ja sen myötä uskottavuuden vahvistaminen on mielestäni EU:n tämän hetken ensisijainen haaste.

Oikeusvaltioperiaatteen toteutumiseen ja vahvistamiseen tähtäävillä toimilla ja sääntöpohjaista kansainvälistä järjestelmää puolustamalla vahvistamme unionia kokonaisuutena, rakennamme keskinäistä luottamusta, kasvatamme resilienssiämme ulkoisia haasteita vastaan ja vahvistamme uskottavuuttamme globaalilla tasolla.

Hyvät ystävät,

EU tekee Euroopasta kilpailukykyisen talousalueen. EU mahdollistaa paremmin globaalien haasteiden, kuten ilmastonmuutoksen ja biodiversiteettikadon torjunnan. Tällaiset maiden rajat ylittävät ongelmat eivät ole ratkaistavissa ilman EU:n vahvaa panostusta – nämä haasteet on ratkottava yhteisin voimin, yhdessä toimien.

EU:n suurimpiin vahvuuksiin kuulukin se, että muodostamme maailman suurimman sisämarkkinan. Kun EU-asettaa markkinoillaan kauppaa käyville maille vaatimuksia, on EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden usein järkevä seurata esimerkkiä. Tähän voimamme perustuu.

Koska EU on globaali toimija globaalissa maailmassa, emme voi sulkea silmiämme siltä, että elämme jatkossakin keskinäisriippuvaisessa maailmassa. Emme siis voi sivuuttaa esimerkiksi Kiinan kasvavaa vaikutusvaltaa, mutta meidän on tunnistettava haavoittuvuutemme paremmin ja pyrittävä paikkaamaan niitä mahdollisimman tehokkaasti.

Samalla on täysin olennaista kehittää EU:n omia vahvuuksia unionin kilpailukyvyn varmistamiseksi. Vapaaseen liikkuvuuteen perustuvat sisämarkkinat, avoin ja sääntöpohjainen kauppapolitiikka sekä markkinaehtoiset ratkaisut ovat avainasemassa, jotta eurooppalaisista innovaatioista voi syntyä globaaleja ratkaisuja.

Haitallisten riippuvuuksien vähentämiseen ja toimitusketjujen monipuolistamiseen tarvitaan kauppaa ja kumppanuuksien rakentamista. Silloin on tärkeä varmistaa, että kumppanuudet rakentuvat hyviin ja terveisiin suhteisiin.

Siksi tarvitsemme myös EU:n, joka pystyy toimimaan tehokkaasti Kiinan vastapainona tiiviissä yhteistyössä USA:n kanssa. Transatlanttinen kumppanuutemme Yhdysvaltojen kanssa on EU:n ja sen jäsenmaiden kaikkein tärkein ja strategisin suhde. USA on toki myös kilpailija, mutta ennen kaikkea kumppani.

Tällä yhteistyöllä on ratkaiseva merkitys myös siinä, että saavutamme ulkopoliittiset tavoitteemme tehokkaammin.

Tästä tukemme Ukrainalle Venäjän hyökkäyssodan jälkeen on keskeinen esimerkki. On selvää, että esimerkiksi taloudelliset sanktiot purevat paremmin, kun niitä toteuttavat samanaikaisesti useampi taho.

Ja kuten aiemmin mainitsin, yhteistyötä ei tarvita vain tästä talouden ja turvallisuuden näkökulmasta. Myös kaikissa globaaleissa haasteissa yhteistyö on keskeistä

Yhteistyö Euroopan unionin ja Yhdysvaltojen välillä luo vakautta ja vaurautta Atlantin molemmin puolin, sekä laajemminkin. EU:n ja Yhdysvaltojen välinen taloudellinen suhde on monella tapaa globaalin kaupan ja investointien peruskallio. On tärkeää, että myös taloussuhteemme toimii.

Kahden suuren talouden välillä suhde ei kuitenkaan aina ole ilman ryppyjä. Tällä hetkellä minua huolettaa Yhdysvaltojen IRA-elvytys, eli Inflation Reduction Act, ja sen vaikutus eurooppalaisten ja tietenkin suomalaisten yritysten vientiin ja näin olleen koko EU:n kilpailukykyyn.

Elämme koronan jälkeisessä maailmassa, mutta uskottelemme itsellemme vielä, että näin ei ole. On suuri vaara siitä, että jätämme valtiotukihanat auki ja sen kautta sekoitamme paitsi oman kilpailukykymme myös sisämarkkinamme.

Tarvitsemme yhteisiä pelisääntöjä, vapaata kauppaa ja kilpailuneutraliteetin vahvistamista – emme välineitä, joilla vääristetään markkinoita ja jotka vievät meidät uusprotektionismin tielle.

Hyvät kuulijat,

EU-jäsenyydellä on suomalaisten vahva tuki.

Viimeisimmän EVA:n Arvo- ja asennetutkimuksen mukaan 64 prosenttia suomalaisista suhtautuu EU:hun myönteisesti. The European Social Surveyn mukaan jopa yli 80 prosenttia suomalaisista suhtautuu positiivisesti EU-jäsenyyteen. Etenkin nuoret suhtautuvat myönteisesti EU:hun.

Nämä luvut ovat iloinen asia.

Suomalaisten näkökulmasta yksi pidetyimmistä EU:n tuomista eduista on ollut vapaa liikkuvuus: oikeus asua, työskennellä ja opiskella missä tahansa EU-maassa. Sisämarkkinat avaavat mahdollisuuksia suomalaisille yrityksille kansainvälistyä ja kasvaa. Osana EU:ta Suomi on kokoaan suurempi – EU-jäsenvaltiona olemme mukana vaikuttamassa siihen, mihin suuntaan sekä unioni että maailma kehittyvät.

Suomi on jatkossakin aktiivinen, luotettava ja ratkaisuhakuinen jäsenvaltio. Me haluamme kilpailukykyisen ja globaalilla tasolla vahvan unionin. Edistämme mm. puhtaan energian investointeja, luonnonvarojen kestävää hyödyntämistä ja syvenevää puolustusyhteistyötä EU:ssa.

Ja jos – ja kun – emme aina ole tyytyväisiä EU:n päätöksiin, meidän on ymmärrettävä katsoa peiliin: me olemme osa EU:ta, emme passiivinen toimija. Jos päätökset eivät tunnu Suomen edun mukaisilta, meidän on kehityttävä vaikuttamistyössämme paremmiksi.

Ratkaisu ei ole EU-erolla flirttailu. Ja ei, jos ero ei nyt ole ajankohtainen, koska, ja tässä siteeraan erästä julkisuudessa käytyä keskustelua: ”tiedostamme yhä vallitsevan maailmantilanteen” ja koska ”jakaantunut Länsi-Eurooppa olisi heikompi totalitaaristen maiden uhan alla”, niin ei se ole sitä tulevaisuudessakaan.

Suomen maantieteellinen sijainti ei nimittäin muutu. Euroopan sijainti kahden suurvallan välissä ja Venäjän naapurissa ei sekään muutu. EU vahvistaa yksittäisten valtioiden kyvykkyyksiä niin kauppapoliittisesti kuin turvallisuuspoliittisestikin. On vaikea nähdä, että globaali kilpailu muuttuisi tavalla, joka suosisi pieniä valtioita isojen toimijoiden sijaan.

Tosiasioiden tunnustaminen on viisauden alku. Ja naiivi flirttailu EU-erolla on vastuutonta äänten kalastelua.

Hyvät Eurooppanuoret, hyvät Linnaseminaariin osallistujat,

Tämän viikonlopun aikana teillä on, ja on ollut, ohjelmassa monia tärkeitä ja kiinnostavia aiheita vihreästä siirtymästä ja nuorten hyvinvoinnista ja osaamisesta ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaan.

Iloitsen erityisesti siitä, että teidän on huomenna määrä kuulla mahdollisuuksista EU-uriin – eurooppaministerinä toivon, että Suomesta hakeuduttaisiin EU-virkoihin paljon nykyistä innokkaammin.

Myös opiskelijavaihtoa tulisi edistää ja siitä tulee pitää aktiivisesti huolta. Suomesta ulkomaille lähtevien opiskelijoiden määrä on pudonnut kolmannekseen viime vuosikymmenen puoliväliin verrattuna. Tämä on huolestuttava kehityssuunta ja asia, johon on kiinnitettävä huomiota. Samalla tarvitsemme myös ulkomaisia opiskelijoita ja opiskelijavaihtoa Suomeen.

On nimittäin harha ajatella, että kansainvälisyyttä synnytetään kotisohvalta käsin. On mentävä rajojemme ulkopuolelle ja opittava itse. Itse elin vuoden vaihto-oppilaana Portugalissa 17-vuotiaana. Opin portugalin kielen, ja opin rakastamaan niin fadoa kuin kuivattua turskaa. Opiskeluaikanani työskentelin Italiassa. Opin italian kielen ja ymmärtämään Palladion nerouden. Jatkoin Barcelonaan, rakastuin paellaan ja Gaudíin.

Hyvät ystävät: lähtekää ulkomaille, oppikaa kieliä, rakastukaa Eurooppaan.

Haluaisin, että mahdollisimman moni näkisi ja saisi itse kokea kansainvälisyyden ja kansainvälisten kokemusten hyödyn ja niiden tuoman rikkauden. Siksi tarvitsemme Eurooppanuorten kaltaisia toimijoita – järjestöjä, jotka edistävät eurooppamyönteisyyttä ja kansainvälisyyttä. Sitä tarvitsemme erityisesti tänään. Toivon teille onnea ja men

Speech at Student Investment Summit 18.8.2023

Dear attendees of the Student Investment Summit,

Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the summit. I am delighted to see such a large crowd here today.

The overarching theme of today’s event is megatrends shaping the future. What are the big things that drive change? What are the phenomena that make the lives of our kids different from what we are living today? Or, in this case, and maybe your case: What is the trend that turns an entrepreneur that starts something in a garage somewhere today into a global success story tomorrow?

The European Commission’s Competence Centre on Foresight has identified 14 – yes, 14 – global megatrends that are relevant for the future of Europe.

These range from issues regarding widening inequality, accelerating technological change, and continuing urbanization to climate change, aggravating resource scarcity, and the changing security paradigm. Some of these are opportunities. Some of these are threats. Some need you to solve them, some open up a new world of opportunities.

All these issues are topical and need to be addressed. However, it is the last one, regarding the changing security paradigm, which will serve as the link to my speech here today.

When you invest in something, you bet on the future. You calculate and you make assumptions. In the best of worlds, there is a reasonable probability that your prediction is right. Often it isn’t. It’s hard to predict the behaviour of billions of people.

When developing society you want stableness. When your invest you want the same. You want a situation in which the relationship between cause and effect is foreseeable, in order to be able to make the right decisions.

Then there are situations in which unforeseen circumstances immediately change the equation. Those that bought Moderna stock in late 2019 and sold it two years later profited from a catastrophe. As did those that had Saab or Statoil stock before the war.

But these are anomalies. In general, stability is good. For me – a politician – and for you, the investors.

And we have had too little of that, too little of stability, lately.

Our geopolitical landscape underwent a radical change a year and a half ago – a change that in many ways has served as a wakeup call for Europe. I am, of course, talking about Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The attack profoundly changed our security landscape in Europe.

I was in a surgical operation when the invasion started. When I woke up from the anaesthesia, the world had changed.

It had changed. But it also rang a bell. For us Finns it was a familiar situation – an authoritarian Russia wants to, through deceit and violence, swallow a smaller neighbour.

In 1939, Stalin had ordered a piece from Shostakovich to be played in Helsinki after the successful and swift invasion. That never came to be. And Kiev also still stands.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine showed that Russia wants to destroy the European security order. By attacking Ukraine, Russia tries to claim Ukraine within its sphere of influence. This can’t be the playbook of this century. There is no place for this kind of zero-sum game thinking in the 2020s.

This was an unexpected event. But still, we should have seen it coming.

Russia has tried to undermine European security for quite some time, and the attack is a continuation in this development. We didn’t react hard enough in 2008. We didn’t act hard enough in 2014. Now we have acted.

The unity the European Union showed in the wake of the attack might have taken Russia by surprise. The EU was exceptionally quick, united and efficient in its response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

At the same time I can’t stop thinking about what could have been. If we had been capable of imagining this scenario, and thought out the possible reactions to it ahead of time, could we have stopped it?

If we had told Russia that we will support Ukraine with weapons and that we will, among other things, freeze Russian assets and shut its access to SWIFT – would that have made a difference?

I think it would have. Contingency plans are good to have in politics, but also when running businesses or when investing.

But here we are.

We Finns support Ukraine in many ways. Since the start of the war, Finland’s total assistance to Ukraine amounts to 1,74 billion euros. This includes about 490 million euros of humanitarian aid and development cooperation assistance as well as 17 packages of defense materiel assistance amounting to 1,2 billion euros.

How much is that? When you compare our economy to the American one, it is equivalent to the US giving 137 billion dollars. It is a significant amount.

And it doesn’t stop here. Finland will continue its support to Ukraine as long as needed.

What are the results of the war so far? It has devastated Ukraine. It has caused immense harm. The wear has been the scene of tens of thousands possible Russian war crimes. It is an immense tragedy.

But it has also caused other things: It has trashed the influence Russia had globally. It has destroyed the economy of Russia and the future of at least a generation of Russians. It has doubled Russia’s border with NATO and made Finland and soon Sweden NATO members.

When the only countries that vote for you in the UN are Syria, Belarus, North Korea, and Eritrea, you know you have a problem. That’s where Russia is today.

There are several lessons to be learned from this war.

It has shown us how important it is to stay united in Europe, how important it is to build relationships and bridges. It has shown that we need to have common rules in order to function properly. It has shown us the importance of democracy, of democratic processes, as well as the importance of rule of law.

We have challenges within the union. The discussion around the sanctions against Russia has once again brought to light the differences and discrepancies we have within the union. Our values are not totally in line. Are world views are not the always the same. And this creates problems in both good and bad times.

The ongoing Rule of Law Mechanism in the EU is a key tool in strengthening the rule of law in member states. It is process where the whereby the Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament engage in an annual dialogue with Member States on issues related to rule of law. With the mechanism, we can promote the development of rule of law within the union.

Rule of law is exceptionally important in a union, which in many ways is based on transfers of resources and shared responsibilities.  The rules must be the same for all. If you accept money from the EU, you must also play by the same rules.

Another important lesson we have learned is the fragility of our energy market. Russia used its control on energy resources as a tool to gain advantage and to put pressure on Europe. The war has showed us how vulnerable the union was in its dependency on fossil fuels from Russia.

We knew that Russia uses energy as a weapon. We had seen it before. And still, we went on building the Nordstream pipeline, thus tying yet another noose around our neck.

When I, together with then fellow Member of Parliament, now Minister for Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen, questioned the sanity of the Nord Stream project in 2016, arguing that it has security policy implications for the EU and Finland, we were dismissed. “It is only an environmental matter”, was the answer.

Today we know better. Energy can be a weapon.

This underlines the importance to continue in promoting the green transition and renewable energy production. It is critical to our security in so many ways.

EU is a global frontrunner in green transition and on its way to become the first climate neutral continent. The work on the measures to achieve the EU 2030 climate target – the so-called Fit for 55 -package – has been successfully concluded. As a next step, the EU needs to start working on the milestone to be set for 2040. It is important that Finland is active in these discussions.

Achieving global carbon neutrality and then carbon negativity will require several technological breakthroughs and a subsequent industrial transformation. Finland is well placed to lead the way in this process. Use and export of clean economy solutions aim at increasing Finland’s carbon handprint – a concept we seek to mainstream also at EU level.

There are few industries we can say for certain that will grow in the future. The green economy is one. Only in Finland there are projects that add up to around 100 billion euros in the pipeline.

This is not naïveté. It is hard industrial and economic policy. Pure and simple.

Finland’s position as a leader in the circular economy will also create new work and business. We need a better functioning single market that supports circular solutions, including a European market for secondary raw materials.

It would also help Europe reduce risks related to strategic dependencies.

This brings me to the third lesson from the war: The need to minimize strategic resource dependencies and to guarantee security of supply. We have been naïve in relying on resources from authoritarian states, which then can use our dependencies in extortive purposes.

However, the lesson here is not to turn inwards. We are and we will continue to exist in an interdependent world. Instead, the lesson is to be more aware of our weaknesses and to take action to minimize our strategic dependencies.

We should ask ourselves: What does the world look like in the wake of the war, where all supply chains have been altered and dependencies have been exposed and exploited? How do we navigate these dependencies?

It is no easy challenge to strengthen national security of supply while also strengthening the inner market at the EU level. An efficient market is a market where everybody competes fairly – both countries and companies. And the EU can only be effective and competitive globally if our internal structures are efficient.

We are in a post-Covid reality. State involvement in the economy has to be geared down. If countries enter into a race of state subsidies, Finland will have difficulties to compete for investments in industry. Here there is reason to be concerned about the attitudes in some major EU countries.

I go back to the green economy: We have immense potential in the clean energy market. We have cheap and clean electricity. We have Europe’s best electrical grid. We have the raw materials needed for the battery industry.

But if this becomes a battleground of state subsidies we might still not come out as winners.

Dear friends,

Free trade must include a sound assessment of what democracy deficit means and what risks it entails. We need to be better in assessing what it means to do business with authoritarian states.

At the same time, it is important to strengthen our relationship with our partners. The transatlantic partnership is the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States.

The closely coordinated transatlantic response to Russian aggression on Ukraine has demonstrated the nature of this strong relationship. It has become self-evident that in the face of current geopolitical challenges, our partnership is stronger and more important than ever.

The EU and the US are strategic partners and allies also economically. The EU and the US are together the bedrock of global trade and investment. Transatlantic trade is a key artery of the global economy.

However, with two large economies, it is no surprise that there are also challenges (e.g. Inflation Reduction Act, IRA). Potential irritants remain on trade policy. It is important that during times like these we do our utmost to enhance the dialogue on the difficult questions.

And, if you allow me to reflect on a recent non-issue that popped up in our political discussion: Let’s not flirt with EU-scepticism. It is irresponsible and naive to think that a country like Finland could be better off outside of the world’s biggest market, than inside it.

Our primary challenges are global: Climate change, biodiversity loss, security, democracy, the economy. To solve these issues, we need the EU, and no amount of irresponsible nostalgia or wishful thinking trumps – no pun intended – this fact.

Dear friends,

The changes in our security landscape have been profound in the past couple of years. We need to learn, and we need to adapt. We need to strengthen our partnerships and focus on building new, sound ones. We need to take measures to tackle the dependencies that have been revealed, and we need to secure competitive neutrality and a functioning single market.

This we do it best, when we do it together.

Thank you.

EU:sta eroamisessa ei olisi järjen häivää

Suomalaisista yli 80 prosenttia suhtautuu positiivisesti EU-jäsenyyteen. Tämä on Euroopan korkeimpia lukuja. Kansalaismielipiteeseen on selvät syynsä: meillä suomalaisilla on kokemusta siitä, minkälaista on jäädä isojen yhteisöjen ulkopuolelle. NATO:on, EU:hun, EFTA:an ja Pohjoismaiseen neuvostoon kuulumattomuus pienensivät aikoinaan liikkumavaraamme niin taloudellisessa kuin poliittisessa mielessä. Ukrainan sodan puhkeaminen osoitti raa’alla tavalla, mitä isomman yhteisön ulkopuolelle kuulumattomuus voi tarkoittaa juuri tässä ajassa. 

Myös sisämarkkinat, vapaa ihmisten, tavaroiden ja palveluiden liikkuvuus ja esimerkiksi opiskelijavaihto-ohjelma Erasmus+ ovat kaikki Suomea ja suomalaisia hyödyttäviä asioita. Kuulumalla EU:hun Suomella on myös kokoaan suurempi mahdollisuus vaikuttaa globaalilla tasolla.

Kaikesta huolimatta aika ajoin joku esittää poliittisena tavoitteena EU:sta eroamisen. Tänään eduskunnan puhemies Jussi Halla-aho totesi, että se on perussuomalaisten pitkän aikavälin tavoite. Halla-aho toteaa, että ero olisi oikeutettu, koska EU rajoittaa jäsenmaidensa suvereeniutta ”demokratiavajeen johdosta”.

EU:sta eroaminen ei kuitenkaan ole tavoite, jota perusuomalaiset ajavat tässä hallituksessa, eikä niin voi ollakaan, koska sellaista tavoitetta ei hallitusohjelmaan ole kirjattu. Suomen EU-politiikan pitkä linja jatkuu hallituksesta toiseen ja tämä linja on ollut maallemme eduksi.

Se, että hallituksessa olevilla puolueilla on puolueen tasolla ollut erilaisia näkemyksiä asioista, ei tietenkään ole mikään ennenäkemätön asia. Erilaisen näkökannat eivät estä hallitusta toimimasta ohjelmansa mukaisesti.

Aina kun joku leikkii tällaisen ajatuksen kanssa, on kuitenkin syytä pysähtyä pohtimaan, mitä tällaisen pyrkimyksen taustalla on – ja ennen kaikkea, mihin Suomen EU:sta eroaminen johtaisi.

Kaikissa yhteisössä ilmenee kitkaa ja haasteita. Näin on myös EU:ssa. EU kehittyy usein kriisien kautta.

EU:n jatkuva kehittäminen on toivottava ja välttämätönkin asia. On täysin perusteltua kritisoida rakenteita tai prosesseja, jotka eivät palvele yhteisöön kuuluvia maita ja niiden kansalaisia. Kritiikin ja eroamistavoitteen välillä on kuitenkin iso ero, eikä eroajatuksella tule mielestäni leikkiä, jos vaihtoehto on Suomea kurjistava.

Halla-aho toteaa, ettei ero ole ajankohtainen nyt, koska ”tiedostamme yhä vallitsevan maailmantilanteen”. Hänkin uskoo, että jakaantunut Länsi-Eurooppa olisi heikompi totalitaaristen maiden uhan alla.

Ero on haave tai tavoite, joka ei siis ole toteutettavissa tässä ajassa ja maailmassa. Kysynkin siksi: Mikä on se maailma, jossa Suomen eroaminen EU:sta olisi ajankohtaista tai viisasta?

On todennäköistä, että maailmassa tilanteet muuttuvat ja geopoliittiset painopisteet siirtyvät. Tällä hetkellä ei kuitenkaan ole näköpiirissä mitään sellaista, mikä mielestäni puoltaisi eroajatusta. Miksi siis edes heittää sellaista ilmoille?

Suomen maantieteellinen sijainti ei muutu. Euroopan sijainti kahden suurvallan välissä ja Venäjän naapurissa ei sekään muutu. EU vahvistaa yksittäisten valtioiden kyvykkyyksiä niin kauppapoliittisesti kuin turvallisuuspoliittisesti. On vaikea nähdä, että globaali kilpailu muuttuisi tavalla, joka suosisi pieniä valtioita isojen toimijoiden sijaan.

Tosiasioiden tunnustaminen on viisauden alku.

Ei ole sattumaa, että Venäjä pitkään on keskustellut mieluummin yksittäisten EU-maiden kanssa kahdenvälisesti kuin suoraan EU:n kanssa. Vahva EU ei Venäjän maailmankuvassa ole Venäjän etu. Samanlaista asennetta on havaittavissa myös Kiinan vuorovaikutuksessa EU:n kanssa.

EU tekee Euroopasta kilpailukykyisen talousalueen ja mahdollistaa paremmin globaalien haasteiden, kuten ilmastonmuutoksen ja biodiversiteettikadon torjunnan. Tällaiset maiden rajat ylittävät ongelmat eivät ole ratkaistavissa ilman EU:n vahvaa panostusta.

Miksi näin? EU on maailman suurin sisämarkkina. Kun EU-asettaa markkinoillaan kauppaa käyville maille vaatimuksia, on EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden usein järkevä seurata esimerkkiä.

Ja samaan aikaan: Emme voi sulkea silmämme siltä, että Kiinan vaikutusvalta maailmassa kasvaa jatkuvasti. Erityisesti siksi tarvitsemme EU:n, joka pystyy toimimaan tehokkaasti Kiinan vastapainona tiiviissä yhteistyössä USA:n kanssa.

Olisiko Suomi siis paremmassa asemassa ilman EU:ta? Itse en pysty mitenkään näkemään, että tähän kysymykseen voisi vastata myönteisesti.

Euroopan turvallisuus on pitkälti NATO:n harteilla, mutta EU:lla on Euroopan maiden turvallisuuden varmistamisessa Lissabonin sopimuksen myötä tärkeä rooli. Harmaalla vyöhykkeellä oleminen on turvallisuusriski, minkä Ukraina on joutunut karvaasti kokemaan. EU-jäsenyys ei ratkaise kenenkään turvallisuushuolia, mutta se selkeyttää siihen kuuluvien maiden asemaa. Siksi EU:n laajentuminen onkin ottanut viime aikoina askelia eteenpäin. Suomi suhtautuu EU:n laajentumiseen myönteisesti – toki sillä edellytyksellä, että EU:hun jäseniksi hakevat maat täyttävät jäsenyyden ehdot.

Vaihtoehtoisiakin polkuja on kokeiltu: Brexit on jo lyhyessä ajassa osoittautunut virhearvioksi. Kansanäänestys oli tiukka ja sen yhteydessä on myös pohdittu Venäjän vaikuttamisesta äänestyksen lopputulokseen.

Kauppasopimuksia ei tehdä noin vain; vientiin ja tuontiin liittyvän byrokratian lisääntymisellä on suoria vaikutuksia talouteen. Tämä on nähty nyt Isossa-Britanniassa. Myös työvoiman saatavuus on heikentynyt, kun työperäistä maahanmuuttoa on suitsittu. Monet Brexitin puolesta äänestäneistä ovat kertoneet katuneensa päätöstään, mikä myös näkyy kannatusmittauksissa.

On syytä olettaa, että EU:sta eroamisen seuraukset olisivat Suomen kohdalla saman suuntaisia kuin mitä Isossa-Britanniassa on nähty. Sillä erotuksella tosin, ettei Suomella ole Iso-Britannian tapaan globaalisti merkittävää pankkisektoria. Isossa-Britanniassa pankkisektori on toiminut hyvinvoinnin puskurina. Sen vetovoima ei ole haihtunut ilmaan, joskin se on heikentynyt.

Kuten yllä jo mainitsin, suomalaisten näkökulmasta yksi pidetyimmistä EU:n tuomista eduista on ollut vapaa liikkuvuus: oikeus asua, työskennellä ja opiskella missä tahansa EU-maassa. Aktiivinen suhteiden kehittäminen onkin Suomen kaltaiselle pienelle maalle ensiarvoisen tärkeää. Sen sijaan, että puhumme EU:sta eroamisesta, toivoisin meidän tunnistavan EU:n merkityksen kauppasuhteiden ja kouluttautumisen näkökulmasta. Tällaiset suhteet muuttuvat helposti itsestään selviksi, mutta niiden merkitystä ei kannata Suomen menestyksen näkökulmasta vähätellä.

Eurooppa-ministerinä toivon, että Suomesta hakeuduttaisiin EU-virkoihin paljon nykyistä innokkaammin. Jos ja kun emme aina ole tyytyväisiä EU:n päätöksiin, meidän on ymmärrettävä katsoa peiliin: me olemme osa EU:ta, emme passiivinen toimija. Jos päätökset eivät tunnu Suomen edun mukaisilta, meidän on kehityttävä vaikuttamistyössämme paremmiksi.

Myös opiskelijavaihtoa tulisi edistää ja siitä tulee pitää aktiivisesti huolta. Suomesta ulkomaille lähtevien opiskelijoiden määrä on pudonnut kolmannekseen viime vuosikymmenen puoliväliin verrattuna. Yliopistojemme tason parantamiseksi tarvitsemme myös Suomeen suuntautuvaa opiskelijavaihtoa.

EU-kritiikki on hyvä asia. Mikään instituutio ei kehity, ellei siinä esiintyviä ongelmia nosteta rohkeasti esille. Kritiikin on kuitenkin hyvä perustua tosiasioihin ja vaihtoehtoisten polkujen faktapohjaiseen analysointiin, ei nostalgiaan tai mahdolliset ongelmat ohittavaan populismiin.

EU:n ensisijainen haaste tällä hetkellä on mielestäni sen sisäisen toimivuuden ja sen myötä uskottavuuden vahvistaminen. Oikeusvaltiomekanismi on tässä työssä keskeisessä roolissa – se on prosessi, jossa komissio, EU:n neuvosto ja Euroopan parlamentti käy vuosittaista vuoropuhelua jäsenmaiden kanssa oikeusvaltioperiaatteen toteutumiseen ja sen edistämiseen liittyvistä asioista. Kun meillä on monella tapaa tulonsiirtoihin ja osittaiseen yhteisvastuuseen perustava unioni, on pelisääntöjen oltava kaikille samat. Jos otat rahaa vastaan, sinun tulee myös pelata yhteisten sääntöjen mukaan.

Ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikassa taas määräenemmistöpäätöksiin siirtyminen on välttämätöntä. Kun EU:n turvallisuutta haastetaan, on EU:lla oltava toimintakykyä niin kantojen muodostamisessa kuin niiden täytäntöönpanossa.

 

 

Adlercreutz: EU:n globaali vaikuttavuus edellyttää vahvoja sisämarkkinoita

Eurooppa- ja omistajaohjausministeri Anders Adlercreutz osallistui keskusteluun Euroopan ja Afrikan välisistä taloussuhteista muun muassa komissaari Jutta Urpilaisen kanssa torstaina Wasa Future Festivaaleilla. Adlercreutz korosti yhteisten pelisääntöjen merkitystä, jotta unioni on houkutteleva kauppakumppani.

– On tärkeää, että työskentelemme määrätietoisesti EU:n uskottavuuden lisäämiseksi ja vahvistamiseksi maailmanmarkkinoilla. Näin varmistamme, että pysymme kilpailukykyisinä myös tulevaisuudessa. Monia kohtaamiamme maailmanlaajuisia haasteita – esimerkiksi ilmastonmuutosta, demokratiaamme kohdistuvia uhkia, turvallisuushaasteita ja taloutta kokonaisuutena – ei voida ratkaista ilman, että EU on näissä kysymyksissä johtava toimija, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Toimivat sisämarkkinat ovat olleet yksi unionin suurimmista vahvuuksista. Koronaviruspandemian aikana markkinat eivät toimineet normaalisti, ja muun muassa rajoitukset vapaaseen liikkuvuuteen aiheuttivat haasteita.

–  Tämä ajanjakso on jätettävä taaksemme: Olemme täysin riippuvaisia toimivista vapaista sisämarkkinoista, ja meidän on varottava mekanismeja, jotka häiritsevät niitä. Tämä on unionin toimivuuden kannalta keskeistä. Toimivat markkinat vahvistavat kilpailukykyä. Taloudellinen tuki antaa pitkällä aikavälillä vääriä signaaleja ja heikentää markkinoita, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Tilaisuuden aikana, johon myös Ruandan, Mosambikin ja Brasilian edustajat osallistuivat, Adlercreutz korosti keskinäisten kumppanuuksien merkitystä.

–  EU on jo nyt monin tavoin hyvä kumppani ja haluaa olla vielä parempi. Emme käytä yksityisarmeijoita tai osta maan parasta viljelysmaata kaupankäynnin vastineeksi. EU:n tavoitteena on rakentaa pitkäaikaisia kumppanuuksia, jotka perustuvat kestäviin ratkaisuihin ja luovat hyvinvointia, Adlercreutz sanoo.

Adlercreutz on viettänyt koko viikon Pohjanmaalla ja vieraillut useissa yrityksissä.

– Alueella tapahtuu paljon hyvää. Energiasektori luo taloudellista hyvinvointia niin paikallisesti kuin globaalisti, ja useita tärkeitä infrastruktuurihankkeita on suunnitteilla. On ollut innostavaa nähdä, miten yritykset uskaltavat kasvaa ja miten hyvin yhteistyö korkeakoulujen ja teollisuuden välillä toimii, Adlercreutz sanoo.

New Security and Defence Designs – The Case of Finland

(Em Português : aqui )

Many things have happened in only a little more than a year. In my home country Finland a very basic foundation of your security policy has been shattered. Finlands is not any more a neutral country, not even an unaligned one, but a NATO member. That is a situation that very few finns would have thought even possible only 2 years ago but now it is a reality and a self evident fact that no one really calls into question.

Finland and Portugal are both small countries at opposite ends of the European continent. We are both neighbours to a bigger country. We are both little brothers to that bigger neighbour. BUt in one aspect we differ very much.

Where Portugal has the Atlantic along its border Finland has Russia. That has had a profound impact on our sense of security and our approach to foreign policy.

When the former Finnish defence minster Häkämies was asked some 15 years ago what Finland’s biggest security challenge is, he said that there are three challenges.

“They are Russia, Russia and Russia.”

15 years ago that statement raised a lot of eyebrows. It even created some criticism especially from the left side of the political spectrum in Finland.

Today that is viewed as a blunt statement of facts. That is our challenge, and as far as security goes, the only military threat one we have.

I will talk about the situation today, but to approach that point I want to go some time back in history. I’ll talk about the background story of Finland’s  development, how our sense of security was formed, what historical facts and happenings has lead to our approach. How we gradually have released ourselves from our post war trauma, how Finland has approached the west – because it has been a slow and not totally easy process.

I will talk about our security concept and how it differs from other countries’ security solutions. I’ll talk about the  thinking behind it.

And at the end I will discuss the reasons that eventually drove Finland and hopefully also Sweden to become nato members. What the war in Ukraine means for Europe and the world and how it challenges our view of where we are in the world. How should security be viewed in Europe, what is our biggest threat and how can we come out of this crisis with a firmer grasp on reality.

Because it is fair to say, dear friends, that we Europeans have been more than naive for too long a time.

There are moments in time that define a nation. For Finland it is easy to see what that occasion was.

I will come to the war in Ukraine later in this talk, but there are reasons why the war has resonated so strongly with the Finnish population.

On the 30th of November 1939 Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in a war that was supposed to be very short and swift. Shostakovich had already written a musical piece that was to be performed in Helsinki a few days after the attack. Stalin thought that the Red army would be able to march unchallenged to our capital and that the Soviets would be welcomed as liberators and friends.

Much like Putin thought he would be welcomed in Kiev after only three days of fighting.

He did not receive that welcome.

Finland fought for 105 days in what is called The Winter War. Finland was the only country that fought against the Soviets that wasn’t invaded and conquered.

Finland  had to secede some territory, but the losses on the Soviet side were so dramatic that Stalin agreed to strike a peace deal with us Finns.

The winter war learnt us Finns that Russia is a threat, that it can’t be trusted, that it has imperial ambitions and that we have to – and are able to – defend ourselves. Alliances are good but in the end every country has to take care of itself. It is a question of economy, defence, production, education, and most of all cooperation.

That lesson has been the foundation for the Finnish security thinking ever since.

After the war Finland went through some very hard times. We were independent, but we were clearly under Soviet influence. There was a pragmatic need to have good relations with our neighbour in the east and it wasn’t totally without benefits. Finland had a lot of bilateral business relations with the USSR but on the other hand we had limited freedom of movement in the international sphere.

We balanced between the west and the east, slowly nudging us in a westward direction.

When NATO was formed in 1949 it was clear that Finland would not become a member. But neither did Sweden. Sweden stayed outside of NATO because of its long history of neutrality but also out of loyalty to Finland. Had we been left alone on the side of the soviet bear, history could have turned out differently.

But slowly we inched ourself westwards. First Finland became a member of the Nordic council in 1955. IN 1961 Finland struck a free trade deal with EFTA. In 1973 we signed a free trade deal with the EC and in 1986 we joined EFTA.

This all happened during a time where the Finnish approach by many was seen as overly pragmatic. The term “finlandisierung”, “finlandisation”, was coined.

We balanced for our survival, trying to uphold friendly relationships with the USSR while at the same time developing into a market-oriented western country.

I clearly remember how we were kind of ashamed about this “finlandisation” epithet. When I came to Angra as an 17 year old young boy in 1987 I had thought about it a lot and had all kinds of answers ready in my head in case somebody would ask me.

Well, nobody did.

And the era of finlandisation ended sooner than many would have thought.

The crash of the Soviet Union changed history. It did not End it, as Francis Fukuyama thought in his 1992 book, but it changed it.

And that also lead Finland to take the final steps needed to become fully integrated in the Western European context.

We became EU members in 1995 after a fairly tight national referendum. For me, for many Finns, it was a big emotional step. And ever since Finland has been one of the most EU-positive countries in the union. Even if we for a big part of our membership has been a net contributor economically.

But lets go back to security. These are the events that has formed our security concept. Rely on yourself, be ready, be prepared.

Finland has a population of 5,5 million. We have a wartime army strength of 270 thousand soldiers and a reserve of almost a million. We have the biggest artillery in Europe. We have a more powerful armed force than most European countries.

And this is not a new development. We have had a conscription based military during our whole existence. National defence is a national task, you could even call it a mission.

Every young man – and many women – is supposed to serve. And most do it. And it’s is not only a way of teaching military skills or upholding a military readiness, it is also a way of creating national unity.

I often say that the Finnish superpower is trust. A trust in society. Things are fairly easy in Finland. You seldom need a lot of paper work, the promise you make carries a lot of weight.

And I believe  that the shared military service has a lot to do with that.

When a whole class of young people is going through a shared experience, military service, it creates a bond that builds trust. And that trust later on carries into life and  society and makes it easy to agree on many things.

So did the history end with the Cold War? No.

While most European states implemented fundamental transformations of their armed forces in the wake of the Cold War—moving from large- scale warfighting capabilities toward small all-volunteer forces the Finnish approach to defense changed little. Being situated next to a military great power, Russia, the logic for our military defense did not change in the early 1990s, even when the Soviet Union collapsed. Though the Western framework for international security changed remarkably in the 1990s and after, Finland continued to procure main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, fighter interceptors, ground-based air defense missile systems, and other military systems required by a defensive “big war approach.”

We prepared for a situation that most countries thought would never come. We prepared for the situation Ukraine is facing now  – and bought up tanks that the Netherlands didn’t think they’d need any more or cannons Germany wanted to get rid of.

In the middle of the biggest economic crisis Finland ever has had, the depression of the early nineties, we bought a significant amount of F/A 18s from the US. We were ridiculed for living in the old world but thought they might come handy some day. While at the same time hoping they wouldn’t.

The guiding principle in the military defense realm has been that quick U- turns are not possible. Military transformation takes about 30 years. Getting rid of existing capabilities is possible in a few years—building new ones takes years and decades. This is something several countries now has realised.

Today, as during the Cold War, the Finnish defense system is based on the principle that “even the biggest bear will not eat a porcupine.” It is not about matching the level of military capability around Finland’s vicinity; it is about making any potential military operation against Finland so costly that even attempting it does not seem an attractive option. Increasing international cooperation in the field of defense— with Sweden, for example—supports this logic.

I talked earlier about trust. An essential aspect and of a defense capability is the citizens’ will to defend the country. Every effort is made to ensure this will remains high. More than 80 percent of the adult population agrees that Finland should be defended militarily against an attack in all situations, even those in which success is not certain. This among the highest numbers in Europe. I think it is only surpassed by the number of Ukraine.

In other countries the result is significantly lower. As a 2015 Gallup International’s global survey concluded, “61% of those polled across 64 countries would be willing to fight for their country, while 27% would not. However, there are significant variations by region. Willingness to is lowest in Western Europe there it is 25%.”

The numbers are high not because we Finns don’t now what national defence is and what it might mean in practice, but because we do.

General conscription is also a major factor reinforcing the strength of Finnish society. . In addition to providing a required manpower pool of resources to the wartime defense forces, general conscription strengthens the entire society and its resilience during crises. Having a purpose in the society—and being ready to sacrifice time and effort—is a key unifying element. Practically every household in Finland has one or several citizen-soldiers in their midst. I have 5 children – 4 sons and a daughter. My middle son, Alvar, just came out of military service and will continue with an ordinary life studying economics.

I am an officer in the reserve. Most Finns have designated wartime units and designated tasks in case of a crisis.

But security is not only a military matter. The Finnish security doctrine is formed around a concept called the Comprehensive security model. It is built around military defence but above all around the concept that the whole of society has a task in case of a crisis.

We have national defence courses that are attended by most top business executives and civil servants. That means that both businesses and civil society know what builds security. Everybody has a task. Everybody knows what they can and should do in the case of a crisis.

Societal cohesion also has an impact Educated people with jobs and possibilities for a decent life have few or no incentives for anti-societal behaviour. This is particularly true when peoples’ absolute welfare is related to a sense of justice and the just distribution of wealth and welfare within society. That’s why equality of opportunity can’t be overlooked.

When you feel that you have a place in society you want to contribute. When you feel that you receive something you want to give. That is also at the core of the Finnish – or Nordic – model.

And especially today, when attacks can come in various ways, when hybrid warfare can hurt you as much as conventional warfare education is key.

Because Russia has extensive information warfare programs. We know what they did in the 2016 US election. We know what they did in the Brexit referendum. Many right – or left wing radical European parties have shady ties to RUssia. In this reality education is paramount and especially media literacy.

Even if Finland has been the target of extensive information operations from Russia the impact has been modest at best. An educated population can tell true from fake and is more resilient in the face of hybrid attacks.

But lets go back to the present day.

Many of us thought that Russia was a changed country. The good will that poured into Russia in the nineties and still well into this millennium was significant. Yes, maybe we took things for granted, and yes, maybe all the consultation the Russian government received in the 90s wasn’t top notch but still things could have gone in a very different direction.

In its attempt to secure power in the late 90s the circle around Yeltsin did some critical mistakes that really undermined the Russian political system.

And most of all – it underestimated Putin and thought he was a puppet that they could handle. He obviously wasn’t.

Putin is not a democrat. He is a nostalgic imperialist who doesn’t scoff at using even the most harsh of measures in order to achieve his goals.

He didn’t hesitate to level Groznyi. He didn’t hesitate to invade Georgia. He didn’t hesitate in removing his opponents from the playing field whether they are called Lebedev, Politkovskaya or Navalnyi. He didn’t hesitate to invade Crimea, to lie on international or national TV and now he didn’t hesitate to invade Ukraine thus causing the biggest threat to international security since the second word war.

For us it is difficult to see the rationale behind it. For a nostalgic imperialist the rationale is probably very simple. What other things has he caused?

The invasion of Ukraine lead to many things. It was a war that supposedly was motivated by a need to stop countries from joining NATO.

So far it has achieved several things, none of which provably were intended. It has very likely destroyed the economic future for Russia for several decades. It has plummeted the international status of Russia. When your only support in the UN comes from Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, Nicaragua and North Korea you know you have a problem.

The war caused two non-aligned countries, Finland and Sweden, to become NATO members. Well, Sweden is still waiting for Erdogan and Orban to get their act together, but eventually Sweden will enter.

Instead of stopping countries from joining NATO Putin has more than doubled Russia’s border with NATO. That is quite an achievement.

Because NATO wasn’t really on Finland’s radar. We have actually effectively tried to avoid a NATO debate. We rather talked about Nordic cooperation, because it was easier. We rather talked about the defence component of the EUropean Union, because that seemed friendlier.

Thanks to our history NATO was a more difficult subject.

My party was one of only two parties out of nine in parliament who had been positive towards a membership. Now all parties support it.

Support hovered around 20 percent for decades. When Russia invaded Georgia it didn’t move. When Russia invaded Crimea it didn’t move. When I two years ago called for a membership process when it was evident that Russia had something going on it didn’t move.

But when Russian tanks started marching towards Kiev the Finnish people had had enough. Support immediately went over 50% and is now at a steady 80%.

We Finns are pragmatic people. We can be stubborn, but when the situation changes we can change our minds. We thought for too long that you can deal with the Russians. When Putin showed his true face, to quote our President: “when his mask fell off”, we adopted to that reality. And the rest is history. In parliament 187 members voted for a membership and only 6 against. That is an enormous majority.

It was of course of paramount importance that Sweden also joined nato. That lead to some intense shuttling back and forth between Sweden and Finland in March and April of 2022. We Finns had to convince Sweden to change their position. And it wasn’t totally easy.

For Sweden being neutral is an integral part of their national identity. They have ABBA, IKEA, meat balls and neutrality. Parting with that was difficult and the Swedish PM Andersson was very reluctant at first.

Tage Erlander who was a prime minister in Sweden when NATO was formed, said in his memoirs that Sweden stayed out of NATO to an extent out of solidarity with Finland. No we Finns had, out of solidarity, to gently push Sweden into NATO.

And we succeeded, of which I am happy.

WIth Finland and Sweden as member NATO gains some significant capabilities. These countries are strong democracies, two of the more capable military powers in Europe and have  significant defense industries.

Neither of them is a burden and both  can  take care of their defensive reponsibilities.

Considering that, it is sad to see the extent to which a political game has been played around the ratification process. An alliance that essentially depends on the “three musketeers principle”, one for all, all for one, that can’t swiftly ratify the membership of two candidates that absolutely strengthen the alliance has a problem.

So let’s hope the promise Erdogan made in Vilnius a few weeks ago holds.

But in the meantime the war goes on. And it has exposed a lot of problems we had refused to see until now.

Europe has been all to dependent on the US for its defence. We have dismantled our defence industry and our readiness. Most countries have dismantled their conscription based systems and turned towards all voluntary forces that are small and more suitable for small limited tasks than defending Europe.

During this year Europe has helped Ukraine in many ways. Also militarily. It has also been a revelation in the negative sense that we do not have the adequate stockpiles. We have howitzers, but not enough ammunition. We might have planes, but few have tanks,

I was one of two Finnidh parlamentarians that started the European Leopard-initiative that lead to several European countries shipping Leopard 1 and 2 tanks to Ukraine. While we have plentiful numbers of these modern tanks in Europe only a few of the are in shape to be rolled out if there was to be a crisis.

Our readiness has been abysmally bad.

NATO does now cover a big part of the EU. It is not worthwhile building parallel structures. But even if we have NATO every country has to carry its own weight. There are very few things a think DOnald Trump deserves credit for, but bringing up the NATO 2% – rule is one of them. Every country should spend at least 2% of its GDP on defence for us to have credible capacities, living next door to Russia.

And taking a page from the Finnish comprehensive defence toolkit: Security is a broad concept. We realised last year what energy dependence means.

A reliance on fossil fuels and resources that are in the hands of authoritarian dictators lead to dependencies that can be catastrophic. We cannot close our eyes to democracy deficits when dealing with countries  and must take a critical look at our dependencies in general.

And as this summers forest fires have showed us time an again. Security is also an environmental issue. A world in which climate change rages in not secure for anybody. But that is a discussion for a differentiaali discussion. 

Thank you for listening, and I am happy to take any questions a you might have.

 

(Käännös Portigaliksi pidetystä puheesta konferenssissa ”Novos Desafios de Segurança e Defesa” 2.8.2023)

Novos desenhos de segurança e defesa: o caso da Finlândia

(In English: here )

Muitas coisas aconteceram em pouco mais de um ano. No meu país natal, a Finlândia, foi destruído um alicerce básico da política de segurança. A Finlândia já não é um país neutro, nem sequer um país não alinhado, mas um membro da NATO. Esta é uma situação que muito poucos finlandeses teriam pensado ser possível há apenas dois anos, mas que agora é uma realidade e um facto evidente que ninguém põe em causa.

A Finlândia e Portugal são dois pequenos países situados em extremos opostos do continente europeu. Somos ambos vizinhos de um país maior. Somos ambos irmãos mais pequenos desse vizinho maior. Mas num aspeto somos muito diferentes.

Enquanto Portugal tem o Atlântico ao longo da sua fronteira, a Finlândia tem a Rússia. Isso teve um impacto profundo no nosso sentimento de segurança e na nossa abordagem à política externa.

Quando, há cerca de quinze anos, perguntaram ao antigo Ministro da Defesa finlandês, Häkämies, qual era o maior desafio da Finlândia em termos de segurança, ele respondeu que havia três desafios:

”A Rússia, a Rússia e a Rússia”.

Há quinze anos, esta declaração deu que falar. Chegou mesmo a suscitar algumas críticas, especialmente do lado esquerdo do espetro político finlandês.

Hoje em dia, é vista como uma franca exposição dos factos. É esse o nosso desafio e, no que respeita à segurança, a nossa única ameaça militar.

Irei falar sobre a situação atual, mas para chegar a esse ponto quero recuar um pouco na história. Falarei sobre os antecedentes do desenvolvimento da Finlândia, como se formou o nosso sentimento de segurança, que factos e acontecimentos históricos conduziram à nossa abordagem. Como nos libertámos gradualmente do trauma pós-guerra, como a Finlândia se aproximou do Ocidente – porque tem sido um processo lento e não totalmente fácil.

Falarei sobre o nosso conceito de segurança e sobre como difere das soluções de segurança de outros países. Falarei sobre o pensamento por trás dele.

E, no final, abordarei as razões que acabaram por levar a Finlândia e, espero, também a Suécia a se tornarem membros da NATO. O que significa a guerra na Ucrânia para a Europa e para o mundo e como desafia a visão que temos da nossa posição no mundo. Como deve ser encarada a segurança na Europa, qual é a nossa maior ameaça e como podemos sair desta crise com um melhor conhecimento da realidade.

Porque verdade seja dita, caros amigos, nós, europeus, fomos mais do que ingénuos durante demasiado tempo.

Há momentos que definem uma nação. No caso da Finlândia, é fácil perceber qual foi esse momento.

Falarei da guerra na Ucrânia mais adiante, mas há razões para a guerra ter tido uma tão grande repercussão na população finlandesa.

A trinta de novembro de mil novecentos e trinta e nove, a Finlândia foi atacada pela União Soviética, numa guerra que se previa muito curta e rápida. Shostakovich já havia composto uma peça musical para ser apresentada em Helsínquia alguns dias após o ataque. Estaline pensou que o Exército Vermelho poderia marchar sem contestação até à nossa capital e que os soviéticos seriam recebidos como libertadores e amigos.

Tal como Putin pensou que seria bem recebido em Kiev após apenas três dias de combates.

Não foi esse o acolhimento que teve.

A Finlândia lutou durante cento e cinco dias na chamada Guerra de Inverno. Foi o único país que lutou contra os soviéticos e que não foi invadido e conquistado.

A Finlândia teve de ceder algum território, mas as perdas do lado soviético foram tão dramáticas que Estaline aceitou celebrar um acordo de paz com os finlandeses.

A Guerra de Inverno ensinou-nos, a nós, finlandeses, que a Rússia é uma ameaça, que não se pode confiar nela, que tem ambições imperiais, e que temos – e somos capazes – de nos defender. As alianças são uma coisa boa, mas, no fim de contas, cada país tem de cuidar de si próprio. É uma questão de economia, de defesa, de produção, de educação e, acima de tudo, de cooperação.

Essa lição tem sido a base do pensamento finlandês em matéria de segurança desde então.

Depois da guerra, a Finlândia passou por momentos muito difíceis. Éramos independentes, mas estávamos claramente sob influência soviética. Havia uma necessidade pragmática de manter boas relações com o nosso vizinho de Leste, o que não era totalmente desprovido de benefícios. A Finlândia tinha muitas relações comerciais bilaterais com a União Soviética, mas, por outro lado, a nossa liberdade de circulação na esfera internacional era limitada.

Balançávamos entre o Ocidente e o Leste, sendo lentamente empurrados para o lado ocidental.

Quando a NATO foi formada em mil novecentos e quarenta e nove, ficou claro que a Finlândia não se tornaria membro. Mas a Suécia também não. A Suécia ficou de fora da NATO devido à sua longa história de neutralidade, mas também por lealdade para com a Finlândia. Se tivéssemos ficado sozinhos ao lado do urso soviético, a história poderia ter tido um desfecho diferente.

Mas, lentamente, fomos avançando em direção ao ocidente. Em mil novecentos e cinquenta e cinco, a Finlândia tornou-se membro do Conselho Nórdico. Em mil novecentos e sessenta e um, a Finlândia celebrou um acordo de comércio livre com a EFTA. Em mil novecentos e setenta e três, assinámos um acordo de comércio livre com a Comunidade Europeia e, em mil novecentos e oitenta e seis, aderimos à EFTA.

Tudo isto aconteceu numa altura em que a abordagem finlandesa era vista por muitos como excessivamente pragmática. Cunhou-se o termo ”finlandisierung”, ”finlandização”.

Equilibrámo-nos por uma questão de sobrevivência, tentando manter relações amigáveis com a União Soviética e, ao mesmo tempo, evoluir para um país ocidental orientado para o mercado.

Lembro-me claramente de como nos sentíamos um pouco envergonhados com o epíteto de ”finlandização”. Quando vim para Angra, em mil novecentos e oitenta e sete, com dezassete anos, já tinha pensado muito sobre o assunto e tinha todas as respostas na ponta da língua para o caso de alguém me perguntar.

Bem, ninguém perguntou.

E a era da finlandização terminou mais cedo do que muitos pensavam.

O colapso da União Soviética mudou a História. Não acabou com ela, como pensava Francis Fukuyama no seu livro de mil novecentos e noventa e dois, mas mudou-a.

E isso também levou a Finlândia a dar os derradeiros passos necessários à sua plena integração no contexto da Europa Ocidental.

Tornámo-nos membros da União Europeia em mil novecentos e noventa e cinco, após um referendo nacional bastante renhido. Para mim, para muitos finlandeses, foi um grande passo em termos emocionais. Desde então, a Finlândia tem sido um dos países mais favoráveis à União Europeia dentro da própria União. Apesar de, durante uma grande parte da nossa adesão, termos sido um contribuinte líquido do ponto de vista económico.

Mas voltemos à segurança. Foram esses acontecimentos que moldaram o nosso conceito de segurança. Confiar em si próprio, estar pronto, estar preparado.

A Finlândia tem uma população de cinco vírgula cinco milhões de habitantes. Temos um exército de duzentos e setenta mil soldados em tempo de guerra e uma reserva de quase um milhão. Temos a maior artilharia da Europa. As nossas forças armadas são mais poderosas do que as da maioria dos países europeus.

E isto não é de agora. O serviço militar obrigatório foi sempre uma constante durante toda a nossa existência. A defesa nacional é uma tarefa nacional. Pode mesmo dizer-se que é uma missão.

Espera-se que todos os rapazes – e muitas raparigas – cumpram serviço militar. E a maioria dos rapazes cumpre. E não é apenas uma forma de ensinar competências militares ou de manter a prontidão militar, mas também um modo de criar unidade nacional.

Costumo dizer que o superpoder finlandês é a confiança. A confiança na sociedade. As coisas são bastante fáceis na Finlândia. Raramente se precisa de muita papelada, a palavra dada tem muito peso.

E creio que o serviço militar partilhado tem muito que ver com isso.

Quando um grupo inteiro de jovens passa por uma experiência comum, o serviço militar, cria-se um laço que gera confiança. E essa confiança, mais tarde, é transportada para a vida e para a sociedade e facilita a concordância em muitas coisas.

Então a história chegou ao fim com a Guerra Fria? Não.

Enquanto a maioria dos Estados europeus implementou transformações fundamentais nas suas forças armadas no rescaldo da Guerra Fria – passando de capacidades de combate em grande escala a pequenas forças totalmente voluntárias – a abordagem finlandesa à defesa pouco mudou. Estando situada junto a uma grande potência militar, a Rússia, a lógica da nossa defesa militar não se alterou no início da década de noventa, nem sequer quando a União Soviética entrou em colapso. Embora o enquadramento ocidental da segurança internacional tenha mudado consideravelmente nos anos noventa e seguintes, a Finlândia continuou a adquirir tanques de batalha, sistemas de lançamento múltiplo de foguetes, caças intercetores, sistemas de mísseis terrestres de defesa aérea, e outros sistemas militares necessários a uma abordagem defensiva de “grande guerra”.

Preparámo-nos para uma situação que a maioria dos países pensou que nunca iria acontecer. Preparámo-nos para a situação que a Ucrânia está a enfrentar agora – e comprámos tanques que os Países Baixos pensavam já não precisar ou canhões de que a Alemanha se queria livrar.

No meio da maior crise económica que a Finlândia alguma vez teve, a depressão do início dos anos noventa, comprámos uma quantidade significativa de F/A dezoito aos Estados Unidos. Fomos ridicularizados por vivermos no velho mundo, mas pensámos que poderiam vir a ser úteis um dia. Ao mesmo tempo que esperávamos que não viessem a sê-lo.

O princípio orientador no domínio da defesa militar tem sido o de que não é possível inverter a marcha rapidamente. A transformação militar demora cerca de trinta anos. Livrar-se das capacidades existentes é possível em poucos anos – construir novas capacidades demora anos, décadas. Isto é algo de que vários países já se aperceberam.

Atualmente, tal como durante a Guerra Fria, o sistema de defesa finlandês baseia-se no princípio de que ”nem o maior dos ursos come um porco-espinho”. Não se trata de igualar o nível de capacidade militar da vizinhança da Finlândia; trata-se de tornar qualquer potencial operação militar contra a Finlândia tão dispendiosa que nem sequer tentá-la seja uma opção atrativa. O aumento da cooperação internacional no domínio da defesa – com a Suécia, por exemplo – apoia esta lógica.

Há pouco falei de confiança. Um aspeto essencial de uma capacidade de defesa é a vontade que os cidadãos têm de defender o país. São envidados todos os esforços para que essa vontade se mantenha elevada. Mais de oitenta por cento da população adulta concorda que a Finlândia deve ser defendida militarmente contra um ataque em todas as situações, mesmo naquelas em que o sucesso não é garantido. É uma das percentagens mais elevadas da Europa. Penso que só é ultrapassada pela da Ucrânia.

Noutros países, o resultado é significativamente inferior. Como concluiu um inquérito global da Gallup Internacional em dois mil e quinze, ”sessenta e um por cento dos inquiridos em sessenta e quatro países estariam dispostos a lutar pelo seu país, enquanto vinte e sete por cento não estariam. No entanto, existem variações significativas por região. A vontade de lutar é mais baixa na Europa Ocidental, situando-se nos vinte e cinco por cento”.

Os números são elevados não porque nós, finlandeses, não saibamos o que é a defesa nacional e o que pode significar na prática, mas porque sabemos.

O serviço militar obrigatório é também um fator importante que intensifica a força da sociedade finlandesa. Para além de fornecer um conjunto de recursos humanos necessário às forças de defesa em tempo de guerra, o serviço militar obrigatório fortalece toda a sociedade e a sua capacidade de resistência em situações de crise. Ter uma finalidade na sociedade – e estar pronto a sacrificar tempo e esforço – é um elemento unificador fundamental. Praticamente todos os agregados familiares na Finlândia têm um ou vários cidadãos-soldados no seu seio. Eu tenho cinco filhos – quatro filhos e uma filha. O meu filho do meio, Alvar, acabou de sair do serviço militar e vai continuar com a sua vida normal de estudante de economia.

Eu sou um oficial na reserva. A maioria dos finlandeses tem unidades designadas em tempo de guerra e tarefas designadas em caso de crise.

Mas a segurança não é apenas uma questão militar. A doutrina de segurança finlandesa articula-se em torno de um conceito chamado modelo de segurança abrangente. É construído em torno da defesa militar, mas sobretudo em torno do conceito de que toda a sociedade tem uma tarefa em caso de crise.

Temos cursos de defesa nacional que são frequentados pela maioria dos executivos de topo e funcionários públicos. Isto significa que tanto as empresas como a sociedade civil sabem o que contribui para a segurança. Todos têm uma tarefa. Todos sabem o que podem e devem fazer em caso de crise.

A coesão social também tem um impacto. As pessoas instruídas, com emprego e possibilidades de uma vida decente, têm poucos ou nenhuns incentivos para um comportamento antissocial. Isto é particularmente verdade quando o bem-estar absoluto das pessoas está relacionado com um sentido de justiça e com a justa distribuição da riqueza e do bem-estar na sociedade. É por isso que a igualdade de oportunidades não pode ser negligenciada.

Quando sentimos que temos um lugar na sociedade, queremos contribuir. Quando sentimos que recebemos algo, queremos dar. Esta é também a essência do modelo finlandês – ou nórdico.

E, especialmente hoje em dia, quando os ataques podem surgir de várias formas, quando a guerra híbrida pode prejudicar-nos tanto como a guerra convencional, a educação é fundamental.

Porque a Rússia tem programas alargados de guerra de informação. Sabemos o que fizeram nas eleições de dois mil e dezasseis nos Estados Unidos. Sabemos o que fizeram no referendo do Brexit. Muitos partidos europeus radicais de direita ou de esquerda têm laços obscuros com a Rússia. Perante esta realidade, a educação é fundamental e, especialmente, a literacia mediática.

Mesmo que a Finlândia tenha sido alvo de operações de informação alargadas por parte da Rússia, o impacto foi, na melhor das hipóteses, modesto. Uma população instruída sabe distinguir o verdadeiro do falso e é mais resistente a ataques híbridos.

Mas voltemos à atualidade.

Muitos de nós pensámos que a Rússia era um país mudado. A boa vontade que se alastrou pela Rússia nos anos noventa e ainda durante este milénio foi significativa. Sim, talvez tenhamos tomado as coisas como garantidas, e sim, talvez toda as consultas de que o governo russo usufruiu nos anos noventa não tenham sido de primeira água, mas mesmo assim as coisas poderiam ter seguido um rumo muito diferente.

Na sua tentativa de assegurar o poder no final dos anos noventa, o círculo em torno de Ieltsin cometeu alguns erros críticos que minaram efetivamente o sistema político russo.

E, acima de tudo, subestimaram Putin e pensaram que ele era um fantoche que podiam manipular. Obviamente não era.

Putin não é um democrata. É um imperialista nostálgico que não se coíbe de utilizar até as medidas mais duras para atingir os seus objetivos.

Não hesitou em arrasar Grozny. Não hesitou em invadir a Geórgia. Não hesitou em remover os seus opositores do terreno, quer se chamem Lebedev, Politkovskaya ou Navalny. Não hesitou em invadir a Crimeia, em mentir na televisão internacional ou nacional, e agora não hesitou em invadir a Ucrânia, causando assim a maior ameaça à segurança internacional desde a segunda guerra mundial.

Para nós, é difícil ver a fundamentação lógica por detrás disso. Para um imperialista nostálgico, a fundamentação lógica é provavelmente muito simples. Que mais causou ele?

A invasão da Ucrânia conduziu a muitas coisas. Foi uma guerra que, supostamente, foi motivada pela necessidade de impedir os países de aderirem à NATO.

Até à data, teve vários efeitos, nenhum dos quais, comprovadamente, era pretendido. Destruiu, muito provavelmente, o futuro económico da Rússia por várias décadas. Fez cair a pique o estatuto internacional do país. Quando o único apoio na ONU vem da Bielorrússia, da Eritreia, da Síria, e da Coreia do Norte, a Russia tem um problema.

A guerra fez com que dois países não alinhados, a Finlândia e a Suécia, se tornassem membros da NATO. Bem, a Suécia ainda está à espera que Erdogan e Orban se organizem, mas acabará por entrar.

Em vez de impedir os países de aderirem à NATO, Putin mais do que duplicou a fronteira da Rússia com a NATO. É um feito e tanto.

Porque, na verdade, a NATO não estava no radar da Finlândia. De facto, tentámos evitar um debate sobre a NATO. Preferimos falar da cooperação nórdica, por ser mais fácil. Preferimos falar da componente de defesa da União Europeia, pois parecia mais amigável.

Devido à nossa história, a NATO era um assunto mais difícil.

O meu partido foi um de apenas dois, num total de nove, no parlamento, que se mostraram favoráveis a uma adesão. Agora, todos os partidos a apoiam.

Durante décadas, o apoio rondou os vinte por cento. Quando a Rússia invadiu a Geórgia, não se alterou. Quando a Rússia invadiu a Crimeia, não se alterou. Quando, há dois anos, eu próprio apelei a um processo de adesão, já que era evidente que a Rússia estava a planear algo, não se alterou.

Mas quando os tanques russos começaram a marchar em direção a Kiev, os finlandeses fartaram-se. O apoio ultrapassou imediatamente os cinquenta por cento e está agora nos oitenta por cento.

Nós, os finlandeses, somos pessoas pragmáticas. Podemos ser teimosos, mas quando a situação muda, podemos mudar de ideias. Durante demasiado tempo, pensámos que era possível negociar com os russos. Quando Putin mostrou a sua verdadeira face ou, para citar o nosso Presidente Niinistö, ”quando lhe caiu a máscara”, adotámos essa realidade. E o resto é história. No Parlamento, cento e oitenta e sete deputados votaram a favor da adesão e apenas seis votaram contra. Trata-se de uma enorme maioria.

Naturalmente, era extremamente importante que a Suécia também aderisse à NATO. Isso levou a um intenso vaivém entre a Suécia e a Finlândia em março e abril de dois mil e vinte e dois. Nós, finlandeses, tivemos de convencer a Suécia a alterar a sua posição. E não foi tarefa fácil.

Para a Suécia, a neutralidade faz parte integrante da sua identidade nacional. Têm os ABBA, o IKEA, as almôndegas e a neutralidade. Não foi fácil abandonar essa identidade e o primeiro-ministro sueco Andersson mostrou-se muito relutante no início.

Tage Erlander, que era primeiro-ministro da Suécia quando a NATO foi formada, disse nas suas memórias que a Suécia ficou de fora da NATO, de certa forma, por solidariedade para com a Finlândia. Agora, nós, finlandeses, tivemos, por solidariedade, de empurrar suavemente a Suécia para a NATO.

E conseguimos, o que me deixa muito feliz.

Com a Finlândia e a Suécia como membros, a NATO ganha algumas capacidades significativas. Estes países são democracias fortes, duas das potências militares mais capazes da Europa e têm indústrias de defesa consideráveis.

Nenhum deles é um fardo e ambos podem assumir as suas responsabilidades defensivas.

Tendo isso em consideração, é triste constatar até que ponto o processo de ratificação foi objeto de um jogo político. Uma aliança que depende essencialmente do ”princípio dos três mosqueteiros”, um por todos, todos por um, e que não consegue ratificar rapidamente a adesão de dois candidatos que a reforçam de forma inequívoca, tem um problema. 

Por isso, esperemos que a promessa que Erdogan fez em Vilnius há algumas semanas se mantenha.

Mas, entretanto, a guerra continua. E expôs muitos problemas que, até agora, nos tínhamos recusado a ver.

A Europa tem estado demasiado dependente dos Estados Unidos para a sua defesa. Desmantelámos a nossa indústria de defesa e a nossa prontidão. A maioria dos países desmantelou os seus sistemas de serviço militar obrigatório e virou-se para forças voluntárias que são pequenas e mais adequadas a tarefas limitadas do que à defesa da Europa.

Durante este ano, a Europa tem ajudado a Ucrânia de muitas formas. Também militarmente. Foi também uma revelação, no sentido negativo, o facto de não dispormos de stocks adequados. Temos obuses, mas não temos munições suficientes. Podemos ter aviões, mas poucos têm tanques.

Fui um dos dois deputados finlandeses que lançaram a iniciativa europeia “Leopard”, que levou vários países europeus a enviar tanques Leopard um e dois para a Ucrânia. Embora tenhamos um número abundante destes tanques modernos na Europa, apenas alguns estão em condições de ser utilizados em caso de crise.

Temos estado terrivelmente mal preparados.

Atualmente, a NATO cobre uma grande parte da União Europeia. Não vale a pena construir estruturas paralelas. Mas mesmo que tenhamos a NATO, cada país tem de suportar o seu próprio peso. A meu ver, há muito poucas coisas pelas quais Donald Trump merece crédito, mas a regra dos dois por cento da NATO é uma delas. Todos os países devem gastar pelo menos dois por cento do seu PIB em defesa, para que tenhamos capacidades credíveis, já que vivemos ao lado da Rússia.

E a crer no abrangente kit de ferramentas de defesa finlandês, a segurança é um conceito amplo. No ano passado, apercebemo-nos do que significa a dependência energética.

Depender de combustíveis fósseis e de recursos que estão nas mãos de ditadores autoritários conduz a dependências que podem ser catastróficas. Não podemos fechar os olhos aos défices democráticos quando lidamos com países e devemos ter uma visão crítica das nossas dependências em geral.

E como os incêndios florestais deste verão nos têm mostrado uma e outra vez, a segurança é também uma questão ambiental. Um mundo em que as alterações climáticas grassam não é seguro para ninguém. Mas isto seria tema para outra conversa.

Obrigado por me ouvirem e tenho todo o gosto em responder a quaisquer questões que me queiram colocar.

New Security and Defence Designs – the Case of Finland

(Em Português : aqui )

Many things have happened in only a little more than a year. In my home country Finland a very basic foundation of your security policy has been shattered. Finlands is not any more a neutral country, not even an unaligned one, but a NATO member. That is a situation that very few finns would have thought even possible only 2 years ago but now it is a reality and a self evident fact that no one really calls into question. 

Finland and Portugal are both small countries at opposite ends of the European continent. We are both neighbours to a bigger country. We are both little brothers to that bigger neighbour. BUt in one aspect we differ very much. 

Where Portugal has the Atlantic along its border Finland has Russia. That has had a profound impact on our sense of security and our approach to foreign policy. 

When the former Finnish defence minster Häkämies was asked some 15 years ago what Finland’s biggest security challenge is, he said that there are three challenges. 

“They are Russia, Russia and Russia.”

15 years ago that statement raised a lot of eyebrows. It even created some criticism especially from the left side of the political spectrum in Finland.

Today that is viewed as a blunt statement of facts. That is our challenge, and as far as security goes, the only military threat one we have. 

I will talk about the situation today, but to approach that point I want to go some time back in history. I’ll talk about the background story of Finland’s  development, how our sense of security was formed, what historical facts and happenings has lead to our approach. How we gradually have released ourselves from our post war trauma, how Finland has approached the west – because it has been a slow and not totally easy process. 

I will talk about our security concept and how it differs from other countries’ security solutions. I’ll talk about the  thinking behind it. 

And at the end I will discuss the reasons that eventually drove Finland and hopefully also Sweden to become nato members. What the war in Ukraine means for Europe and the world and how it challenges our view of where we are in the world. How should security be viewed in Europe, what is our biggest threat and how can we come out of this crisis with a firmer grasp on reality. 

Because it is fair to say, dear friends, that we Europeans have been more than naive for too long a time. 

There are moments in time that define a nation. For Finland it is easy to see what that occasion was. 

I will come to the war in Ukraine later in this talk, but there are reasons why the war has resonated so strongly with the Finnish population. 

On the 30th of November 1939 Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in a war that was supposed to be very short and swift. Shostakovich had already written a musical piece that was to be performed in Helsinki a few days after the attack. Stalin thought that the Red army would be able to march unchallenged to our capital and that the Soviets would be welcomed as liberators and friends. 

Much like Putin thought he would be welcomed in Kiev after only three days of fighting.  

He did not receive that welcome. 

Finland fought for 105 days in what is called The Winter War. Finland was the only country that fought against the Soviets that wasn’t invaded and conquered. 

Finland  had to secede some territory, but the losses on the Soviet side were so dramatic that Stalin agreed to strike a peace deal with us Finns. 

The winter war learnt us Finns that Russia is a threat, that it can’t be trusted, that it has imperial ambitions and that we have to – and are able to – defend ourselves. Alliances are good but in the end every country has to take care of itself. It is a question of economy, defence, production, education, and most of all cooperation. 

That lesson has been the foundation for the Finnish security thinking ever since. 

After the war Finland went through some very hard times. We were independent, but we were clearly under Soviet influence. There was a pragmatic need to have good relations with our neighbour in the east and it wasn’t totally without benefits. Finland had a lot of bilateral business relations with the USSR but on the other hand we had limited freedom of movement in the international sphere. 

We balanced between the west and the east, slowly nudging us in a westward direction. 

When NATO was formed in 1949 it was clear that Finland would not become a member. But neither did Sweden. Sweden stayed outside of NATO because of its long history of neutrality but also out of loyalty to Finland. Had we been left alone on the side of the soviet bear, history could have turned out differently. 

But slowly we inched ourself westwards. First Finland became a member of the Nordic council in 1955. IN 1961 Finland struck a free trade deal with EFTA. In 1973 we signed a free trade deal with the EC and in 1986 we joined EFTA. 

This all happened during a time where the Finnish approach by many was seen as overly pragmatic. The term “finlandisierung”, “finlandisation”, was coined. 

We balanced for our survival, trying to uphold friendly relationships with the USSR while at the same time developing into a market-oriented western country. 

I clearly remember how we were kind of ashamed about this “finlandisation” epithet. When I came to Angra as an 17 year old young boy in 1987 I had thought about it a lot and had all kinds of answers ready in my head in case somebody would ask me. 

Well, nobody did. 

And the era of finlandisation ended sooner than many would have thought. 

The crash of the Soviet Union changed history. It did not End it, as Francis Fukuyama thought in his 1992 book, but it changed it. 

And that also lead Finland to take the final steps needed to become fully integrated in the Western European context. 

We became EU members in 1995 after a fairly tight national referendum. For me, for many Finns, it was a big emotional step. And ever since Finland has been one of the most EU-positive countries in the union. Even if we for a big part of our membership has been a net contributor economically. 

But lets go back to security. These are the events that has formed our security concept. Rely on yourself, be ready, be prepared. 

Finland has a population of 5,5 million. We have a wartime army strength of 270 thousand soldiers and a reserve of almost a million. We have the biggest artillery in Europe. We have a more powerful armed force than most European countries. 

And this is not a new development. We have had a conscription based military during our whole existence. National defence is a national task, you could even call it a mission. 

Every young man – and many women – is supposed to serve. And most do it. And it’s is not only a way of teaching military skills or upholding a military readiness, it is also a way of creating national unity. 

I often say that the Finnish superpower is trust. A trust in society. Things are fairly easy in Finland. You seldom need a lot of paper work, the promise you make carries a lot of weight. 

And I believe  that the shared military service has a lot to do with that. 

When a whole class of young people is going through a shared experience, military service, it creates a bond that builds trust. And that trust later on carries into life and  society and makes it easy to agree on many things. 

So did the history end with the Cold War? No. 

While most European states implemented fundamental transformations of their armed forces in the wake of the Cold War—moving from large- scale warfighting capabilities toward small all-volunteer forces the Finnish approach to defense changed little. Being situated next to a military great power, Russia, the logic for our military defense did not change in the early 1990s, even when the Soviet Union collapsed. Though the Western framework for international security changed remarkably in the 1990s and after, Finland continued to procure main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, fighter interceptors, ground-based air defense missile systems, and other military systems required by a defensive “big war approach.” 

We prepared for a situation that most countries thought would never come. We prepared for the situation Ukraine is facing now  – and bought up tanks that the Netherlands didn’t think they’d need any more or cannons Germany wanted to get rid of. 

In the middle of the biggest economic crisis Finland ever has had, the depression of the early nineties, we bought a significant amount of F/A 18s from the US. We were ridiculed for living in the old world but thought they might come handy some day. While at the same time hoping they wouldn’t. 

The guiding principle in the military defense realm has been that quick U- turns are not possible. Military transformation takes about 30 years. Getting rid of existing capabilities is possible in a few years—building new ones takes years and decades. This is something several countries now has realised. 

Today, as during the Cold War, the Finnish defense system is based on the principle that “even the biggest bear will not eat a porcupine.” It is not about matching the level of military capability around Finland’s vicinity; it is about making any potential military operation against Finland so costly that even attempting it does not seem an attractive option. Increasing international cooperation in the field of defense— with Sweden, for example—supports this logic.

I talked earlier about trust. An essential aspect and of a defense capability is the citizens’ will to defend the country. Every effort is made to ensure this will remains high. More than 80 percent of the adult population agrees that Finland should be defended militarily against an attack in all situations, even those in which success is not certain. This among the highest numbers in Europe. I think it is only surpassed by the number of Ukraine. 

In other countries the result is significantly lower. As a 2015 Gallup International’s global survey concluded, “61% of those polled across 64 countries would be willing to fight for their country, while 27% would not. However, there are significant variations by region. Willingness to is lowest in Western Europe there it is 25%.”

The numbers are high not because we Finns don’t now what national defence is and what it might mean in practice, but because we do. 

General conscription is also a major factor reinforcing the strength of Finnish society. . In addition to providing a required manpower pool of resources to the wartime defense forces, general conscription strengthens the entire society and its resilience during crises. Having a purpose in the society—and being ready to sacrifice time and effort—is a key unifying element. Practically every household in Finland has one or several citizen-soldiers in their midst. I have 5 children – 4 sons and a daughter. My middle son, Alvar, just came out of military service and will continue with an ordinary life studying economics. 

I am an officer in the reserve. Most Finns have designated wartime units and designated tasks in case of a crisis. 

But security is not only a military matter. The Finnish security doctrine is formed around a concept called the Comprehensive security model. It is built around military defence but above all around the concept that the whole of society has a task in case of a crisis. 

We have national defence courses that are attended by most top business executives and civil servants. That means that both businesses and civil society know what builds security. Everybody has a task. Everybody knows what they can and should do in the case of a crisis. 

Societal cohesion also has an impact Educated people with jobs and possibilities for a decent life have few or no incentives for anti-societal behaviour. This is particularly true when peoples’ absolute welfare is related to a sense of justice and the just distribution of wealth and welfare within society. That’s why equality of opportunity can’t be overlooked. 

When you feel that you have a place in society you want to contribute. When you feel that you receive something you want to give. That is also at the core of the Finnish – or Nordic – model. 

And especially today, when attacks can come in various ways, when hybrid warfare can hurt you as much as conventional warfare education is key. 

Because Russia has extensive information warfare programs. We know what they did in the 2016 US election. We know what they did in the Brexit referendum. Many right – or left wing radical European parties have shady ties to RUssia. In this reality education is paramount and especially media literacy. 

Even if Finland has been the target of extensive information operations from Russia the impact has been modest at best. An educated population can tell true from fake and is more resilient in the face of hybrid attacks. 

But lets go back to the present day. 

Many of us thought that Russia was a changed country. The good will that poured into Russia in the nineties and still well into this millennium was significant. Yes, maybe we took things for granted, and yes, maybe all the consultation the Russian government received in the 90s wasn’t top notch but still things could have gone in a very different direction. 

In its attempt to secure power in the late 90s the circle around Yeltsin did some critical mistakes that really undermined the Russian political system. 

And most of all – it underestimated Putin and thought he was a puppet that they could handle. He obviously wasn’t. 

Putin is not a democrat. He is a nostalgic imperialist who doesn’t scoff at using even the most harsh of measures in order to achieve his goals. 

He didn’t hesitate to level Groznyi. He didn’t hesitate to invade Georgia. He didn’t hesitate in removing his opponents from the playing field whether they are called Lebedev, Politkovskaya or Navalnyi. He didn’t hesitate to invade Crimea, to lie on international or national TV and now he didn’t hesitate to invade Ukraine thus causing the biggest threat to international security since the second word war. 

For us it is difficult to see the rationale behind it. For a nostalgic imperialist the rationale is probably very simple. What other things has he caused?

The invasion of Ukraine lead to many things. It was a war that supposedly was motivated by a need to stop countries from joining NATO. 

So far it has achieved several things, none of which provably were intended. It has very likely destroyed the economic future for Russia for several decades. It has plummeted the international status of Russia. When your only support in the UN comes from Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, Nicaragua and North Korea you know you have a problem. 

The war caused two non-aligned countries, Finland and Sweden, to become NATO members. Well, Sweden is still waiting for Erdogan and Orban to get their act together, but eventually Sweden will enter. 

Instead of stopping countries from joining NATO Putin has more than doubled Russia’s border with NATO. That is quite an achievement. 

Because NATO wasn’t really on Finland’s radar. We have actually effectively tried to avoid a NATO debate. We rather talked about Nordic cooperation, because it was easier. We rather talked about the defence component of the EUropean Union, because that seemed friendlier. 

Thanks to our history NATO was a more difficult subject. 

My party was one of only two parties out of nine in parliament who had been positive towards a membership. Now all parties support it. 

Support hovered around 20 percent for decades. When Russia invaded Georgia it didn’t move. When Russia invaded Crimea it didn’t move. When I two years ago called for a membership process when it was evident that Russia had something going on it didn’t move. 

But when Russian tanks started marching towards Kiev the Finnish people had had enough. Support immediately went over 50% and is now at a steady 80%. 

We Finns are pragmatic people. We can be stubborn, but when the situation changes we can change our minds. We thought for too long that you can deal with the Russians. When Putin showed his true face, to quote our President: “when his mask fell off”, we adopted to that reality. And the rest is history. In parliament 187 members voted for a membership and only 6 against. That is an enormous majority. 

It was of course of paramount importance that Sweden also joined nato. That lead to some intense shuttling back and forth between Sweden and Finland in March and April of 2022. We Finns had to convince Sweden to change their position. And it wasn’t totally easy. 

For Sweden being neutral is an integral part of their national identity. They have ABBA, IKEA, meat balls and neutrality. Parting with that was difficult and the Swedish PM Andersson was very reluctant at first. 

Tage Erlander who was a prime minister in Sweden when NATO was formed, said in his memoirs that Sweden stayed out of NATO to an extent out of solidarity with Finland. No we Finns had, out of solidarity, to gently push Sweden into NATO. 

And we succeeded, of which I am happy. 

WIth Finland and Sweden as member NATO gains some significant capabilities. These countries are strong democracies, two of the more capable military powers in Europe and have  significant defense industries. 

Neither of them is a burden and both  can  take care of their defensive reponsibilities. 

Considering that, it is sad to see the extent to which a political game has been played around the ratification process. An alliance that essentially depends on the “three musketeers principle”, one for all, all for one, that can’t swiftly ratify the membership of two candidates that absolutely strengthen the alliance has a problem. 

So let’s hope the promise Erdogan made in Vilnius a few weeks ago holds. 

But in the meantime the war goes on. And it has exposed a lot of problems we had refused to see until now. 

Europe has been all to dependent on the US for its defence. We have dismantled our defence industry and our readiness. Most countries have dismantled their conscription based systems and turned towards all voluntary forces that are small and more suitable for small limited tasks than defending Europe. 

During this year Europe has helped Ukraine in many ways. Also militarily. It has also been a revelation in the negative sense that we do not have the adequate stockpiles. We have howitzers, but not enough ammunition. We might have planes, but few have tanks, 

I was one of two Finnidh parlamentarians that started the European Leopard-initiative that lead to several European countries shipping Leopard 1 and 2 tanks to Ukraine. While we have plentiful numbers of these modern tanks in Europe only a few of the are in shape to be rolled out if there was to be a crisis. 

Our readiness has been abysmally bad. 

NATO does now cover a big part of the EU. It is not worthwhile building parallel structures. But even if we have NATO every country has to carry its own weight. There are very few things a think DOnald Trump deserves credit for, but bringing up the NATO 2% – rule is one of them. Every country should spend at least 2% of its GDP on defence for us to have credible capacities, living next door to Russia. 

And taking a page from the Finnish comprehensive defence toolkit: Security is a broad concept. We realised last year what energy dependence means. 

A reliance on fossil fuels and resources that are in the hands of authoritarian dictators lead to dependencies that can be catastrophic. We cannot close our eyes to democracy deficits when dealing with countries  and must take a critical look at our dependencies in general. 

And as this summers forest fires have showed us time an again. Security is also an environmental issue. A world in which climate change rages in not secure for anybody. But that is a discussion for a differentiaali discussion. 

Thank you for listening, and I am happy to take any questions a you might have. 

 

(Käännös Portigaliksi pidetystä puheesta konferenssissa ”Novos Desafios de Segurança e Defesa” 2.8.2023)

Ukraina tarvitsee eurooppalaiset Leopard-talkoot

(English version here)

Sota Ukrainassa etenee kohti toista vuottaan. Aloite on nyt Ukrainalla, mutta nopeaa loppua ei ole näköpiirissä. Kuluttava sota jatkuu.

Ukrainan menestys on nojannut paitsi vahvaan maanpuolustustahtoon, myös länsimaiseen koulutus- ja materiaalitukeen. Tämä tuki ratkaisee osaltaan sen, miten sota päättyy. Meidän, Euroopan ja koko vapaan maailman etu on, että se päättyy Ukrainan mahdollisimman ripeään voittoon. Olisi vaarallista, jos Venäjä kokisi hyötyneensä rikollisesta hyökkäyssodasta millään tavalla. Materiaalista tukea Ukrainalle on siis jatkettava ja vahvistettava.

Sodan alussa kaikissa maissa keskusteltiin paljon avun tasosta ja lähetettävästä materiaalista. Olemme tämän vuoden aikana oppineet paljon. Myös sen, että uudet kyvykkyydet nopeasti voivat muuttaa tilannetta sotatanteereella. Askel askeleelta lähetettävän materiaalin määrää ja suorituskykyä on kasvatettu. Muutos on kuitenkin ollut hidasta. Nyt olisi aika ottaa askel eteenpäin.

Talvi on saapunut. Jäätynyt maa muuttaa jälleen sekä Venäjän että Ukrainan toimintamahdollisuuksia. Tämänkin on syytä näkyä avun laadussa.

Vaikka Ukrainaa on tuettu päättäväisesti, jotkin asejärjestelmät on edelleen rajattu tuen ulkopuolelle. Näihin lukeutuvat läntiset, modernit taistelupanssarivaunut. Tällaiset vaunut lisäisivät merkittävästi Ukrainan iskukykyä taistelukentällä. Uusi kalusto edellyttää koulutusta, ja siksi erityisen arvokasta olisi toimittaa ukrainalaisille laaja määrä samaa vaunutyyppiä, jonka käyttöön ukrainalaisjoukot voidaan kouluttaa tehokkaasti.

Saksalaista alkuperää oleva Leopard 2 -vaunu soveltuisi tarkoitukseen erinomaisesti. Sen eri variaatioita on 1970-luvun lopun jälkeen rakennettu tuhansia kappaleita, ja käyttäjämaihin lukeutuvat Saksan ohella muun muassa Alankomaat, Ruotsi, Tanska, Espanja, Norja, Puola, Kanada sekä Suomi. Vaunu onkin yksi yleisimmin käytössä olevista länsimaisista taistelupanssarivaunuista. Suorituskyvyltään se peittoaa Venäjän neuvostoperäisen kaluston. Kylmän sodan asetelma kun oli, että länttä puolustetaan laadulla neuvostojoukkojen määrää vastaan. 

Yhteisellä eurooppalaisella ponnistuksella olisi mahdollisuus antaa merkittävä lisätuki Ukrainan maataistelukykyyn ja auttaa ehkä ratkaisevalla tavalla Ukrainaa ylläpitämään saavuttamaansa momentumin sodassa. 

Suomella on yhteensä noin kaksisataa Leopard 2 -taistelupanssarivaunua. Maantiede rajoittaa Suomen mahdollisuuksia luovuttaa suurta määrää keskeistä käytössä olevaa kalustoa, mutta Suomen osallistuminen pienelläkin määrällä vaunuja olisi arvokasta, jos eurooppalaiset panssarivaunutalkoot saadaan käyntiin. Sitä tarvitaan nyt. 

Käynnistämällä tämän keskustelun, voisimme myös kylvää isomman ja tehokkaamman tuen siemenen. 

Suomen oma puolustuskyky ei saa vaarantua, mutta on selvää, että Ukrainan menestys sodassa on myös Suomen turvallisuuden kannalta ratkaisevaa. Mikäli vaunuja luovutetaan, on tietysti tärkeä valmistella korvaavat hankinnat.

Eskalaation riskiä tukeen liittyen ei ole syytä yliarvioida. Läntisen tuen luonnetta taistelupanssarivaunut eivät tosiasiassa olennaisesti muuta, eikä lännen tukea Ukrainaan tulisi mitoittaa Venäjän narratiivin vaan omien etujemme ja arvojemme puolustamisen mukaan.

(Yhteiskirjoitus Atte Harjanteen kanssa julkaistu Hufvudstadsbladetissa 27.12.2022)